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Subject on Cyprus:  
Visit of Kyprianou. Dec  
1979. CYPRUS.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  
OF CYPRUS (MR. SPYROS KYPRIANOU), AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON  
29 FEBRUARY 1980 AT 1200 HOURS

<u>Present:</u> Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Rolandis, Foreign Minister
Mr. J.L. Bullard	Mr. Pelagias, Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Rhodes	Mr. Vovides, Director of the President's Office
Mr. Alexander	Mr. Panayides, High Commissioner for Cyprus

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The Cyprus problem

President Kyprianou said that although five years had passed since the Turkish invasion and although repeated efforts had been made to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, no progress whatever had been made. He did not know what Turkey wanted. If Turkey was interested in the welfare or security of Turkish Cypriots, a solution could be found; but if they were interested in expansionism or separatism, then no peaceful solution would be possible. No clear answer had ever been forthcoming about Turkish objectives. Until there was one, no progress would be made.

President Kyprianou said that despite the breakdown last June and the subsequent difficulties, his Government still wished to make progress. They wished to take up the talks at the point where they had been left and on the basis of the ten points agreed in May. The Turks however were insisting on preconditions. There would have to be a change in Turkish attitudes if further talks were to be fruitful. The time had come therefore for the countries of Western Europe to bring their influence to bear in Ankara. There was a tendency to argue that because Turkey was an important ally and because it was going through a difficult period, this was a bad time for the West to try to bring pressure to bear. President Kyprianou said that this was not his view. The moment when the Turkish Government needed the West and when they were receiving so much help, was the time to offer them "advice". The problem could not be solved

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without the involvement of the major countries that wanted to see a solution. Mr. Rolandis pointed out that the Western world as a whole had an interest in finding a solution. At the moment NATO ended in Italy. Greece and Turkey could not become proper allies so long as the Cyprus problem persisted. The consequences of a persistence of the present situation would also be disastrous for Cyprus. Sooner or later a liberation movement would start. The acceptance of partition, or indeed of double union, would result in guerilla warfare.

President Kyprianou said that Britain had a particular role to play. There were special links between the two countries, both directly as a result of the sovereign base areas and of Britain's status as a guarantor power, and as a result of the Commonwealth relationship. The Cypriots did not expect impartiality from Britain: they expected support. Cyprus was at present under British influence and played a pro-Western role in the non-aligned movement. This might change if no solution could be found. It was therefore both important and appropriate for Britain to seek to take the initiative - not in substitution of the efforts of Mr. Waldheim but to assist him.

The Prime Minister said that HMG wanted to see the inter-communal talks start again. We had said so in Ankara and in London. She recognised the importance of the talks for those directly involved, for the people of Cyprus as a whole, and for the Western world. Britain had done, and would go on doing, everything to encourage progress. Why had the talks broken down in June?

President Kyprianou said that at the time the ten points had been agreed, the atmosphere had been good but subsequently the Turks had given the impression that they had changed their mind. In June they had insisted on the acceptance of bizonality as a precondition for progress. Bizonality, as expressed by the Turks, meant not federation but partition. The Greek/Cypriot side had not refused discussion of bizonality but had only refused to accept it as a precondition. The Turks had also talked about the security of the Turkish/Cypriot community in a way which had led the Greek Cypriots to think they envisaged partition. The Greek Cypriots for their part, wanted to talk about the security of all Cypriots.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether it was really the case that bizonality meant partition. If this was the case, there was of course nothing to talk about. But did the Turkish Cypriots not accept the concept of a central authority. While agreeing that they did, President Kyprianou said that it was clear that Mr. Denktash was seeking a form of sovereignty and regarded the relationship between the two parts of Cyprus as essentially an international one. Mr. Rhodes pointed out that the Turks wanted a secure boundary between the two parts of the island with customs and immigration formalities. The Turkish Cypriots' basic worry related to their security. This flowed from what had happened between 1963 and 1974. President Kyprianou said that it was important to differentiate between the attitude of Mr. Denktash and of other Turkish Cypriots, many of whom had made it clear that they would be happy to come to live in "free Cyprus". The Cypriot Government had made proposals for complete demilitarisation. They would be prepared to have an international police force in the country until the sense of insecurity had been removed. In parallel with that there could be a mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police force as there had been in the past. If the worry about security was a genuine one, it could be solved. His concern was that it was in fact an artificial obstacle.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the new Turkish Government was likely to be any more helpful than its predecessor. President Kyprianou thought not. It was the military leaders who took the decisions about Cyprus. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that during his recent visit to Ankara he had pressed for the resumption of the inter-communal talks. Mr. Demirel had said flatly that his Government had no influence with the Turkish Cypriots. This might suggest that President Kyprianou's analysis was correct.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in the end the problem always came back to the fears of the Turkish Cypriots about their security. Was there no form of reassurance that they could be offered or would accept. Mr. Rhodes expressed doubt about this. They wanted a clear line between the two communities. He

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

saw no prospect of an early return of refugees. President Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriot refugees were prepared to live under a Turkish administration if a federal solution could be found. But it was essential to attach precise and agreed meanings to such concepts as federation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely what the negotiations should be about. President Kyprianou said that the Turkish Cypriots could raise anything they liked in renewed talks. The Prime Minister said that it might be dangerous to reopen talks that had broken down without the most careful prior preparation. A further breakdown might be definitive. President Kyprianou said that at present no preparations were in progress, only arguments about concepts. This suited the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community well enough since the longer the deadlock persisted, the more likely it was that the de facto situation would be accepted as de jure. Mr. Denktash and Mr. Caylangil had both made it clear that what they were seeking was the legalisation of what had been "achieved" in 1974. If this was their true objective, no progress would ever be made. The Prime Minister commented that the absence of movement on the Turkish side was depressing.

President Kyprianou said that Cyprus was entitled to justice and to assistance in the achievement of a viable solution. Mistakes might have been made in the past. If so, many people had been responsible. But the real problem was what to do now. The Cypriot Government would like the help of the British Government in resolving the tragedy and in enabling Cyprus to become once more a united country, closely linked with the United Kingdom. Mr. Denktash was not interested in this last point. He had claimed to various Arab countries that while he wanted the British out of the base areas, the Greek Cypriots wanted to keep the bases. Mr. Rhodes commented that Mr. Denktash was probably trying to prove that he was more genuinely non-aligned than President Kyprianou. The Prime Minister repeated Britain's willingness to help but said that the problem seemed to be to give the Turkish Cypriots some assurance that they would be safe in a federal state and that there would be no repetition of earlier events. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Turkish Cypriots would accept nothing that was unsatisfactory to them in relation to security. Was it realistic to suppose that a solution could be found which everyone would welcome at once, i.e. a federal republic with a measure of devolution.

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Would it not be necessary to approach the problem more gradually. Both sides would have to make sacrifices. President Kyprianou said that if an evolutionary approach was adopted it would be the end of Cyprus. The existing divisions would become deeper and deeper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the divisions already existed. The idea would be to try to move away from them. There would have to be initial compromises by both sides.

The Prime Minister said that any such compromises would have to be prepared before the talks began. They should be prepared in private. Mr. Rolandis commented that no major problem had ever been solved in public. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that, given the lack of confidence between the two sides, it might be possible initially to have the two delegations in the same building with an intermediary going between them. This was a technique which had been used frequently during the Rhodesia Conference. The Prime Minister, re-emphasising the need for careful preparation for any new round of talks, said that all options should be explored. In reply to a request from Mr. Rolandis that HMG should use their good offices, the Prime Minister said that we would do what we could to get the Turks to the table. If the talks were restarted, it would be essential to keep them going and to avoid the kind of adjournment that had occurred last June.

#### Cypriot students in the UK

President Kyprianou and Mr. Rolandis expressed dismay at the problems which would be faced by Cypriot students in the United Kingdom who had to pay the full cost of their education here. Mr. Rolandis said that there were 2,500 students in the country at the moment. He added that there was no university in Cyprus and that the fees for a university education in the United Kingdom could not be met by even the most prosperous Cypriot parents. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the Cypriot Government could not subsidise their students to some extent. Mr. Rolandis said that the left wing parties in Cyprus would never agree to this, particularly as they could point out that many universities in Eastern European countries were only too anxious to educate students free of charge. The Prime Minister said

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
- 6 -

that she was unable to hold out much hope that the Government's position would change. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he saw no prospect of aid funds being diverted to help with the problem.

Mr. Rolandis asked whether it would be possible for any arrangements introduced to benefit students from EEC countries to be extended to cover Cypriot students. Cyprus was after all an associate member of the EEC. Mr. Bullard said that so far as he was aware no scheme had yet been agreed to cover EEC students. However, he undertook to ensure that the possibilities were investigated.

(Part of the above discussion took place over lunch. The lunch was attended by Mr. Pattie and Mr. Knighton in addition to those listed at the beginning of this record.)

The discussion ended at 1420.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Bullard', is located on the right side of the page.

29 February 1980

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