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FM FCO 260127Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE (FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

GYPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM U KMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1360 OF 25 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY PARIS OTTAWA BONN PRETORIA LUSAKA LUANDA DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR MUSKIE, NEW YORK, 25 SEPTEMBER.

MIPT'S (NOT TO ALL): SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS EMBARGO.

1. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WAS AN UNFORTUNATE MOMENT TO PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS. MCHENRY TOO ACCEPTED THIS, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITH THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR RATIONALISING FURTHER DELAY. UNLIKE THE SECRETARY OF STATE HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE IN ANY EVENT NOT YET READY TO GO FORWARD WITH THE UN PLAN. THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT OF POSTPONING, BUT NOT AVOIDING, DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE PRESIDENT COULD DRAG HIS FEET UNTIL THE UN VISIT TO PRETORIA ON 20 OCTOBER. BUT HE HAD COME UP WITH A USEFUL PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT THAT SIX SPEAKERS SHOULD BE INSCRIBED BEFORE DISCUSSION BEGAN. GIVEN THE PRESENT PRE-OCCUPATION WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION, IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO MUSTER THIS NUMBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT PAULO JORGE THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER, DID NOT SEEM AT ALL ANXIOUS TO PUSH FOR A TIGHTENING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, BUT WAS CONCENTRATING, UNDERSTANDABLY, ON THE SEARCH FOR A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION. IT WAS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT MIGHT AROUSE AFRICAN SUSPICIONS IF WE WERE TO TRY TOO HARD OR TOO OVERTLY TO PUSH THEM OVER THE ISSUES.

2. ON THE SUBSTANCE, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HOPED THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES COULD STICK AS CLOSE TOGETHER AS POSSIBLE. MUSKIE MADE NO COMMITMENT, CONFINING HIMSELF TO POINTING OUT THAT AMERICAN CONTROLS ON ARMS EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA WERE ALREADY STRICTER THAN THOSE UNDER THE EMBARGO.

3. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT INTERPRETE ANY DIMINUTION OF THE EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN THE PRESSURE OVER THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.

4. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE PROSPECTS AND VIABILITY OF THE CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA, LORD CARRINGTON AND MCHENRY AGREED THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD BE A RECIPE FOR INDEFINITE DELAY. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE WAS THEREFORE PUZZLED BY THE FACT THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE INTERESTED IN A CONFERENCE. MCHENRY CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE NOT. MCHENRY ALSO SUGGESTED A DANGER THAT SWAPO TOO WOULD USE THE CONFERENCE TO DELAY MATTERS: NUJOMA HAD ALWAYS SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO GET TO GRIPS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN.

:-448,059,
CARRINGTON

27 SEP 1980