

The important thing CONFIDENTIAL

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in that we stand with the U.S. Prime Minister.

and that we discuss our approach

I have asked that no action be taken on para 2 (ii) - Confirmation of our commitment to the

PM/81/3 to meet issues together.

Sixth Replenishment of ISA - until the Americans have decided their policy & you have been to Washington.

I think there would be considerable value in

selecting one of your seminars (Lord Lamington + two or three officials) to Development Policy before you go to Washington. May I arrange?

The U.S.C. is going to get very difficult this year and we shall need a sheet anchor with the U.S.

Development Policy

Yes.

And 5/2

You will recall the exchanges of view on this subject that began with the Chancellor's letter and paper of 2

FLAGA

September. Geoffrey Howe's further letter of 21 January provided the focus for a meeting which I held on 26 January with him, John Biffen, Cecil Parkinson, Kenneth Baker and FCO Ministers.

FLAG 'B'

2. I believe the meeting was very useful in helping to determine our approach as we prepare for the various international meetings this year, in particular the Ottawa and North/South Summits. Sir Robert Armstrong has now sent you the paper that has been prepared by officials and which is intended to serve as the British contribution to the aid study being prepared for consideration by Heads of Government at Ottawa. That paper reflects the consensus which has emerged from the recent exchanges on our attitude to aid and development. At my meeting this week we also agreed on the following main points:

- (i) We should continue to underline the responsibility of oil surplus countries to do more to alleviate the economic difficulties brought about by the increases in oil prices. Non-oil developing countries should be encouraged to do more to keep up the pressure on them. In the multilateral field finance was needed from oil producers to swell the funds available to the IMF, and some variant of the proposed IBRD Energy Affiliate

/could



could well be a useful magnet for OPEC funds. To ensure such support from oil producers to an Energy Affiliate we should have to be ready to cede a greater degree of control to them over its operation and probably to make some contribution to the Affiliate ourselves.

(ii) We should confirm our commitment to participate in the General Capital Increase of the IBRD and to the Sixth Replenishment of IDA. It would however not be appropriate, at this early stage of the Reagan Administration, for us to put bilateral pressure on the Americans to carry out their own commitments to the General Capital Increase and the Sixth Replenishment of IDA but at some stage we shall probably wish to draw their attention to the damage that would be caused if they failed to do so, given our common objective of supporting these institutions against developing country proposals for radical change.

(iii) Although the question of IMF quotas had no significance for public expenditure, (in contrast to the issue of contributions to IBRD/IDA) and the link between IMF quotas and IBRD shares was complicated, we should be prepared to see a reduction in both to a level more consistent with our relative economic strength.

(iv) There was a need to put aid in the wider perspective of total financial flows to developing countries: private investment and financial flows had an important and growing contribution to development and this should be recognised.

(v)



- (v) There should be further discussion among Departments of ways in which private flows could be further facilitated. The Department of Trade had some proposals to make, foreshadowed in Mr Nott's letter of 27 October, and the Chancellor undertook to consider the effects of Advance Corporation Tax on outward investment.
- (vi) Although we had interests to protect in international negotiations we should be careful to avoid getting too far out in front. This was largely a question of style. While the substance of our response to Brandt remained right we had to be careful to avoid risking disadvantages in trade terms as a result of our public stance.
- (vii) Particular care will be needed in presenting our 1980 performance in respect of our aid as a proportion of GNP. While the 0.7% "aid target" is not relevant in itself it attracts attention at home and abroad. We can expect criticism this year because our 1980 aid/GNP figure will be substantially below that for 1979, partly but not wholly a reflection of technical factors which worked to our advantage in 1979. Work is now being put in hand on how best to explain the change. In the eventual presentation we should make as much as we can of the increasing flows of private finance.

3. We did not go into detail on the issue of multilateral aid. We all recognise the desirability of putting less emphasis on multilateral aid and Ministers stressed the relative advantages of bilateral aid as a flexible and effective means of achieving the multiple objectives

/served



served by our aid programme - developmental, political, commercial and industrial - but it is plain that there is in practice little room for manoeuvre over this over the next few years. But it remains the case that each multilateral commitment must be examined critically in the light of its cost and possible benefits (eg extra OPEC money).

4. We believe that we should be as constructive as we can at the Summit meetings this year, by concentrating attention on a package of specific measures which are within the constraints of available finance. This would include implementing the IBRD General Capital Increase, and IDA VI replenishment and making progress on the Energy Affiliate or some other arrangement having the same effect in attracting OPEC funds. It would also be useful to see whether we can come up with other ideas to be put forward either independently or in concert with other OECD countries, and there should be further official study of this.

5. I should finally take this opportunity of recording the outcome of a separate exchange of views on the question of the Soviet Union and aid, following discussions at Venice last year. Agreement has now been reached among Departments that we should openly criticise the Russians for their poor aid performance, and urge them to improve it. We do not think that this runs any real risk of causing them to increase their aid on countries where they would not otherwise be active and we may gain some - not very great - political advantage by highlighting their deficiencies. It would also be right to urge them to make a more effective contribution to the UN agencies

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of which they are members (not IMF or IBRD), especially by contributing in convertible currencies.

6. I am copying this to members of OD, to Sir Keith Joseph and to Sir Robert Armstrong.


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(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4 February 1981

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5 FEB 1981

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D/I LPO  
CO LPS  
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SP  
Overseas Ad

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 February, 1981.

Development Policy

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to her of 4 February on development policy. She has commented on the importance of our keeping in step with the Americans on aid questions in the months ahead. She agrees that it would not be appropriate for us to put bilateral pressure on the Americans to carry out their own commitments to the general capital increase in the Sixth Replenishment of IDA at present. She is doubtful about the desirability of our commenting on the damage that might flow from an American failure to implement their commitments. She does not wish any action taken on the confirmation of our own commitment until after her visit to Washington.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and to Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*Americas Aid*



DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
ASHDOWN HOUSE  
123 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1E 6RB  
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212 3301  
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

Secretary of State for Industry

18 February 1981

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Great George Street  
London SW1

*h2*

*Jean Peter*

DEVELOPMENT POLICY

I have seen papers and correspondence on Development Policy which formed the basis of the Ministerial discussion you chaired on 26 January at which Kenneth Baker was present. I agree with the conclusions drawn out in your minute of 4 February to the Prime Minister, and with Robert Armstrong's draft paper for the Economic Summit, but I would just like to underline the points about putting aid into a proper perspective and encouraging a more realistic approach to what it can and cannot do. In this connection, I agreed strongly with what Geoffrey Howe had to say in his letter of 21 January about increasing aid to low income countries and I am glad to see that the more recent papers do not acknowledge any particular responsibility for us to do so.

2 'I would not wish to disagree with those who emphasize the need to avoid being labelled as ring-leaders of a "hard-faced" line on aid. Britain could lose much valuable business if we make ourselves too prominent; but I remain convinced, as I think we all are, that the simplistic division between North and South is quite wrong and there are other aspects of the Brandt analysis which are equally open to challenge, especially, of course, his case for further massive transfers of resources.

3 The point here is that the Brandt Commission's conclusions are derived from a perception of the world which in important respects is at least questionable. The notion that international security is threatened by economic disparities between the so called North and South is not borne out by history over the decades since the war. The report fails to acknowledge the wide variation in the rates of growth of developing countries since World War II and over-estimates the importance of external against internal factors in economic development. It suggests that the developed countries are able to manage the world economy in their favour and that it is possible so to alter this management as to create by administrative intervention

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a new economic order in which greatly increased aid flows play a very important role.

4 We can all see the flaws in this approach (I particularly commend Professor Henderson's critique in the June 1980 issue of "The World Economy"). I would just like to say that I hope our reasonable concern to avoid taking too prominently critical a role in international fora will not mean that we fail to cast doubt on the underlying assumptions of the Brandt Commission and its supporters whenever we see an appropriate opportunity to do so.

5 Perhaps I should mention that I recently received a circular from Evan Luard asking my support of the Brandt Report. I replied on a personal basis courteously and briefly drawing his attention to the flaws in the Report's analysis and in particular to Henderson's article. I attach a copy of Luard's reply since his arguments may help us in our preparation.

6 I am copying this letter to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Luard*

*Kew*

20 JAN 1981



Registered Office:  
 274 BANBURY ROAD · OXFORD OX2 7DZ  
 TELEPHONE: 0865 56777 · TELEX 83610

The Right Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, BT., MP,  
 House of Commons,  
 London S.W.1.

22nd January, 1981

Dear Sir Keith,

It was extremely kind of you to take the trouble, despite all the many other calls on your time, to reply personally to the circular letter I wrote on behalf of Oxfam about the Brandt Report.

I hope that, since you are one of the few people in a position to have substantial influence over the response which this country ultimately makes to the Report, you will forgive me if I reply at some length.

I have in fact read the article by Professor Henderson to which you refer, as well as the longer one he wrote for the World Economy (indeed I know Professor Henderson personally and only recently had lunch with him). I am however, not altogether persuaded by the arguments he uses, which I think he would be the first to accept are directed only to certain features of the Report, above all its general philosophy and which are very little concerned with the specific recommendations the Report makes.

I fully accept the justice of some of the points he makes. I certainly agree, for example, that the Report greatly exaggerates, or even misstates, the relationship between under-development and war (certainly as between rich countries and poor) and overstates the relationship between disarmament and the availability of development funds. On the other hand it understates the rate of development already achieved by some poor countries and makes little attempt to analyse how this has been achieved, nor the reasons for differing rates of growth (not surprisingly, given the varied composition of the Commission.) The Report perhaps also, for obvious reasons, presents a somewhat unduly alarmist picture of the existing state of the international economy, though I think everybody would agree that there are many very disturbing features in this at the present time.

The heart of Professor Henderson's criticism, however, concerns the concept of global Keynesianism. He suggests that if the rich countries want to reflate, they can perfectly well expand their own economies, but have deliberately decided not to do so. But the reason surely that they have decided not to do so, or not too fast at least, is partly because of balance of payments constraints, and partly that they do not wish to risk restimulating inflationary pressures within their own economies. But expansion in the Third World would have no adverse balance of payments consequences and probably some favourable ones for rich countries. At the same time it would clearly have much less effect, certainly a far less direct effect, in stimulating inflation.

Cont.

And indeed insofar as this indirect reflation is directed, ~~as the~~<sup>as the</sup> Report recommends, to increasing production of commodities at present in short supply, for example, oil, food and other raw materials, it could have the reverse effect of bringing a downward influence on prices, not a small bonus for the western world.


I am a little surprised that Professor Henderson, as a firm believer in the market economy, did not pay greater recognition of the strong call in the Report for a liberalisation of world trade and for resistance to growing pressures for protectionism. As Douglas Hurd pointed out in a recent debate in the House of Commons, such steps could probably do more than anything in the field of aid to provide benefits for developing countries if they were resolutely pursued by the rich. As the Report points out, this could provide substantial benefits for consumers in rich countries and, by increasing the foreign exchange resources of poor countries, would also probably lead to orders for exports of other goods, especially the more sophisticated products in which the rich countries should increasingly be specialising. This could help to bring about the progressive readjustment of our industry, out of the old and uncompetitive industries into new, technology-based industries of a kind which I know you are seeking to bring about.

Professor Henderson also says little in the Encounter article about another major theme of the Report: the need to find new ways of recycling oil surpluses, perhaps making more direct use of the international institutions, given the increasing reluctance of the banks to continue to lend to many countries with very high debts on the scale they did during the last decade. I would have thought that few people today could deny the importance of finding such means, and it is encouraging that both the Bank and the Fund are increasingly moving in that direction. It is difficult to see how many poor countries, crippled by a further tripling of the price of oil, world recession and a big increase in the prices of the capital goods they import, will otherwise be able to play any significant part within the world trading economy. I hope very much that the Government will be giving careful attention to the ways in which this can be achieved, including some of those suggested in the Report.

Professor Henderson apparently believes that the Commission places excessive emphasis on the "regulation" of the world economy. But, as I have pointed out, in many respects the Report is calling for less regulation: for example less intervention by national governments to restrict trade flows. The types of international regulation it is concerned with are of a kind that have been practised for many years, and are likely to continue regardless of the response to the Report: for example in the international monetary system. What the Report is recommending (apart from somewhat ambitious ideas for international taxation, to which Professor Henderson has suggested an interesting alternative) is not an increase in regulation but alternative ways of regulating which are likely to be of greater benefit to many developing countries.

There is much more that I could say in reply to Professor Henderson's article (for example concerning his rejection of the idea that countries may have "needs" of food, energy, or foreign exchange, for example) but I do not wish to add to the length of this letter unduly and to try your considerable patience any further. I do hope, however, that you and other members of the Government will, despite the obvious constraints, consider very carefully the ideas that are contained in the Report (which it is generally agreed is attractively written and full of interesting ideas) and may be willing to come up with a positive response at least for some of the proposals which it makes.

Yours sincerely,



Evan Luard

From: The Rt.Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, Bt., M.P.

Evan Luard, Esq.,  
OXFAM,  
274 Banbury Road,  
Oxford, CX2 7DZ.

16th January 1981.

I am sorry not to have replied earlier to your personal circular of November 28th written on OXFAM paper.

I respect the work of OXFAM and have from time to time supported it in a modest way.

But I must point out that what you write on the Brandt Report takes no account of the arguments that you will have read, for instance, in ENCOUNTER, by Professor Henderson.

Registered Office:  
274 BANBURY ROAD · OXFORD OX2 7DZ  
TELEPHONE: 0865 56777 · TELEX 83610

*Den in Keith.*

28th November 1980

OXFAM warmly welcomes the publication of the important proposals in the Brandt Report for a better international management of the world economy and more effective steps to assist poor countries, especially the neediest people within those countries. We are therefore deeply concerned that this country, in common with the other developed states of the world, should make an adequate response to the proposals in the Report. The Report's publication provides a unique opportunity for a major new international effort to tackle the problems of an ailing international economy at the world level.

We were encouraged by the close attention paid to the Report by MPs in the two debates which took place earlier this year and the support that was then given by speakers from all parts of the House for a positive response by Britain. We believe that many members of the House will wish to focus continuing attention on the Report and to do what they can to ensure that there is further constructive discussion of it in the session now beginning.

It now seems that the summit conference proposed in the Report as a means of following up its recommendations is likely to take place in Mexico in the middle of next year. It is important that this country should by then have adopted a clear-cut position on the main proposals in the Report. We very much hope this will be a position that furthers the main objectives of the Brandt Commission: to achieve a better managed world economy and more effective steps to help poor countries in the face of the very difficult economic problems they now face.

In particular we think it important that the position of the British Government should be clarified on the following points:

1. One of the major concerns of the Brandt Commission was that rich countries should make available adequate markets for the exports of poor countries, especially for their simple manufactures, processed goods and agricultural exports (if only in order to ensure that those countries secure the foreign exchange to enable them to buy from us in return). The British Government has stated that it favours a liberal trading system and recently renewed the OECD Trade Declaration renouncing protection. Can the Government give an undertaking that it will not (for example, in the forthcoming negotiations on the Multi-fibre Arrangement) place any new restrictions on imports of this kind from poor countries and that it will seek to reduce those which already exist?
2. The Brandt Report emphasised the special needs of very poor countries, which are deeply affected by the rise in the price of oil (as well as of many of their capital goods imports) but have few resources of their own and are unable to raise money from the international banking system or to attract significant inward investment. The British Government, in their memorandum to the Overseas Aid Sub-Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee about the Brandt Report, also expressed concern about the special needs of these countries. Will the Government undertake to increase development assistance at least to this group of countries (some of which have had their aid cut drastically within the last year) and to give them other special assistance (for example through the extension of the Generalised System of Preferences and of the balance of payments support provided by the IMF)?

3. The Report pointed out that millions of people are close to starvation throughout the Third World because of inadequate food supplies there. The British Government has stated that it does not believe in food aid and has recently refused to join other EEC countries in providing new assistance of this kind. What alternative steps will the British Government take to ensure that the essential food needs of these areas are met, both in the short-term and the long-term?
4. The Brandt Report calls for major reforms in the international monetary system, including more liberal drawing-rights for poor countries over longer periods of time, a larger role for the SDR and a link between monetary and development assistance (that is special allocations of SDR's for poor countries). Given the need to maintain the capacity of poor countries to import and to avoid defaulting on debts, will the British Government undertake to support reforms on these lines?
5. The Report makes important proposals to provide more reliable sources of funds for development assistance, both through a system of 'universal resource mobilisation' under which all countries would be assessed as to their capacity to provide aid and through some system of international taxation, perhaps of the use of international resources such as space orbits or radio frequencies, or a tax on the arms trade. Will the British Government agree either to support some such proposal to secure additional resources or to raise the proportion of GNP which this country at present devotes to development assistance?

These are only a small number of the major areas covered in the Report on which it is important that Britain should adopt a positive position (OXFAM has prepared a set of more detailed briefings on the proposals in the Report which we would be happy to send you if you so wish).

We would like to know whether you agree with us about the importance of this Report and the need for an effective response by the Governments of the rich countries of the world. We would, therefore, be most grateful for your answers to the questions listed below.

I personally would be very happy to come to the House to discuss with you any matters relating to the Report and to the part you can play in promoting it (I have been engaged by OXFAM specifically for the purpose of stimulating discussion of the Report in this country and promoting a positive British response to it). Please let me know if you would welcome a meeting of this kind.

Yours sincerely

*Evan Luard*  
Evan Luard

Can you tell us whether you:

- |  |     |
|--|-----|
| (a) believe that the Brandt Report represents a valuable statement of the needs of the world economy, and of developing countries particularly, at the present time? | Yes |
|  | No  |
| (b) would like to see Britain play a positive role in responding to the proposals in the Report?   | Yes |
|  | No  |
| (c) are willing to speak in your constituency and elsewhere on the themes in the Report?   | Yes |
|  | No  |
| (d) will offer to help in any way possible in Parliament in promoting implementation of the Report (for example by calling for further debates in the House)?        | Yes |
|  | No  |
| (e) would welcome further briefing about the proposals contained in the Report?  | Yes |
|  | No  |

Signed .....

Name .....

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

21 January 1981

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington KCMG, MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

*Handwritten initials/signature*

*NBPN yet  
TPC  
Ph...*

*Dr Peter*

DEVELOPMENT POLICY

It may be helpful in advance of our meeting on this subject on 26 January if I respond in writing to your minute of 20 October, and to the useful paper attached to it. I was glad also to have John Nott's letter of 27 October.

There is clearly a high measure of agreement between us. I think that applies to most of the conclusions in paragraph 18 of the paper attached to your letter. In particular I believe we are agreed that we should take every opportunity to broaden our discussion about the situation of the LDCs beyond aid to cover all the routes by which their position could be improved; and that we should turn discussion away from a rigid distinction between North and South towards a more realistic and detailed analysis of the situation of groups of countries in all parts of the world. I think we are agreed too that this approach covers also support for free trade and a free flow of finance. Conclusions vi and vii of your paper on direct investment and the open trading system seem to me quite right.

I agree with the thought behind conclusion ii of your paper that the UK in particular and the OECD countries in general have no need to be defensive about our efforts on aid or about total flows to the developing countries: and that we should better publicise what we have done. That was one of the themes at the Venice Summit. I agree that we should seek to make development aid as effective as possible in order to help countries to move towards reliance on private finance. I agree too that we should explore all reasonable ways of encouraging OPEC surplus countries to make greater financial contributions, whether through the international financial institutions or in other ways; although I would not want to rule out more market borrowing by the international financial institutions

*/ or in other institutions*

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~~or in other ways; although I would not want to rule out more market borrowing by the international financial institutions as an alternative to obtaining more OPEC funds directly for them, if the OPEC price for direct assistance proves too high.~~

On a different and more domestic plane, there is clearly no room for any increase in our public expenditure plans for aid: quite the contrary. Again, I think that is common ground.

As I see it, there remain several points of great importance on which I believe there is also a high measure of agreement between us but which it may be useful to discuss. The first is that we should not allow the point to be lost sight of that was made so strongly at the Vencie Summit: namely that the oil price increases of the past year have had a very serious impact on the LDCs, imposing a penalty which matches or exceeds the total benefit of aid, and at the same time has reduced the ability of the developed countries to maintain, let alone increase, aid expenditure. This point is made in paragraph 9 of your paper but it puts an important gloss on your conclusion iv, which speaks of OECD countries recognising a responsibility to increase aid to low income countries. For most OECD countries, including especially ourselves, further help for low income countries would have to be at the expense of middle income countries ie redistribution not addition. We already have a very high proportion of our aid flowing to low income countries and the scope for further redistribution is limited. We also have to bear in mind the need to maximise our own commercial advantage. So I see difficulty about recognising a responsibility in the terms used, or in exhorting our partners to do so.

Secondly, I think we have to be ready to say that we simply do not accept the Brandt proposition that there must be a further massive transfer of resources through aid from North to South; or that the principle of planned and increased redistribution between North and South should be written into the international monetary and economic system.

I think, thirdly, that we should also move away from lip-service to the 0.7 per cent aid target which does not correspond to present realities and which masks the relative importance of private flows in balanced and successful development.

I conclude that at the end of the day the relevant international discussions ought to produce the following results. There should be a reaffirmation of what was said in Vencie. There should be a recognition that the main weight of action to improve their situation is bound to fall on the LDCs themselves. But finally the discussions

/should



should concentrate on two or three specific practical steps helpful to the LDCs. My experience at Commonwealth Finance Ministers' conferences and at the IMF suggests that many LDC Ministers are ready to turn away from argument about the generalised and unattainable in favour of discussion of steps which offer practical benefit. This is likely to come back to attainable and near-term steps to maintain or augment the lending of the World Bank and IMF (including, the General Capital Increase of the World Bank and, if it materialises, the Energy Affiliate) and perhaps the question of a further SDR issue by the IMF, though I am far from convinced of the case for that. There should be no attempt to conceal that this action would be limited and evolutionary, but it would be far from negligible in its impact. I see these results as flowing from the relevant discussions in the IMF and World Bank, including the Interim Committee meeting in Libreville in May and the Annual Meeting in Washington in September; and from the Ottawa Summit in July.


Finally, I think we should seek allies for our views and should indeed let others speak first on the realities when we can. We may find the new US Administration tougher than we are on some of these questions. But in the last analysis I think we must be ready to state our convictions firmly but unaggressively if the need arises.

I am copying this minute to the recipients of yours.

GEOFFREY HOWE

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Geoffrey Howe', with a horizontal line underneath.

21 JAN 1981



Overseas Aid



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

21 November 1980

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington KCMG MC.  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth  
Affairs

NBPA

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*Dr Pelt*

DEVELOPMENT POLICY


Thank you for your letter of 19 November. I entirely agree that you and I and Keith Joseph and John Nott should meet as soon as practicable to talk about the papers which have been circulated on this subject. My office will be awaiting an approach from yours.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

*[Handwritten signature and scribbles]*

GEOFFREY HOWE

21 NOV 1980



*Overseas Aid*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1980

*NBPA yet  
Rmt**Dear Geoffrey*Development Policy

When I sent you our paper on Development Policy on 20 October I said that I thought it would be useful for us to meet informally to discuss the issue. Preparations for the Ottawa Summit are now in hand, we have other international gatherings on the horizon and I believe it is none too early to discuss what our approach is to be on aid and development.

I therefore see advantage in meeting as soon as possible and, if you are agreeable, I will ask my secretary to arrange a time that is mutually convenient for yourself, Keith Joseph and John Nott, whose letter of 27 October I read with great interest in preparation for our meeting.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, other members of OD and Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP

119 NOV 1980

