

15

S E C R E T

12444 - 1

DD 112330Z PEKING

DD 112330Z HONG KONG

GRS 332

SECRET

DESKBY 112330Z

FM FCO 111815Z APR 84

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 374 OF 11 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG DESKBY 112330Z

YOUR TELNOS 702, 703 AND 704: FUTURE OF HONG KONG: TRANSITION PERIOD

1. I AGREE THAT ZHOU NAN'S STATEMENT DIVERGES VERY SHARPLY FROM OUR OWN IDEAS AND SHOULD BE COUNTERED FULLY. I SHOULD MYSELF PREFER TO TAKE THE MATTER UP DURING MY VISIT. THE SUBJECT IS AS IMPORTANT AS THOSE OF THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE TIMETABLE. IF THE MATTER IS NOT RAISED DURING THE VISIT, WE COULD GIVE THE CHINESE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR PROPOSALS DID NOT GIVE US TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE CRITICISM BY EXCO THAT I WAS NOT MYSELF PREPARED TO ARGUE HONG KONG'S CASE ON A KEY ISSUE.

2. MEANWHILE I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY ON 12 APRIL, IN THE TALKS OR INFORMALLY, TO SPEAK ON THE GENERAL LINES SUGGESTED IN PARS 2 AND 3 OF THIRD TUR.

3. I SHOULD HOWEVER LIKE TO STRENGTHEN YOUR POINTS (B) AND (C) ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(B) WHILE CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN HMG AND THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL CLEARLY BE NECESSARY AS 1997 APPROACHES, THIS WILL HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY PRESENTED IN ORDER TO AVOID DAMAGE TO CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG. MOREOVER TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE 'TRANSITION PERIOD' WOULD START AS SOON AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WOULD HIT CONFIDENCE BADLY. OPINION WILL NEED TIME TO GET USED TO THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST TO AVOID FORMALLY DESIGNATING THE PERIOD PRE-1997 AS A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

(C) OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE SO FAR FOCUSSED ON TWO CONCEPTS:

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THAT OF CONTINUITY AND THAT OF AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION BY THE  
PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. WE SHOULD NOT ESTABLISH ANY MACHINERY  
BEFORE 1997 WHICH COULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CENTRAL  
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARING TO ADMINISTER HONG KONG  
RATHER THAN TO LEAVE ADMINISTRATION TO THE PEOPLE OF THE  
TERRITORY. NOR WOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO UNDERTAKE SUBSTANTIAL  
CHANGES IN THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OR OTHER  
FIELDS, SINCE THIS WOULD NEGATE THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUITY.

HOWE

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SECRET

SECRET

GRS 410

SECRET

DESKBY 111100Z

FROM PEKING 110945Z APR  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 703 OF 11/4/84

INFOR IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

MIPT: TWELFTH ROUND: FIRST DAY: COMMENT

1. THE CHINESE PROPOSALS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT AND 1997 GO FAR BEYOND THE LIMITED MACHINERY AND SCOPE OF CONSULTATION WHICH OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS WERE CONTEMPLATING IN LATE MARCH (YOUR TEL NO 587 TO HONG KONG).

2. THE PROPOSALS HAVE A NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE FEATURES. ONE EXAMPLE IS THAT THE CHINESE SHOULD BE CONSULTED ON ALL IMPORTANT MATTERS BETWEEN CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT AND 1997. IN THE FINANCIAL FIELD THEY ARE INDEED SEEKING MORE THAN THIS, PROPOSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE BANK OF CHINA SHOULD HAVE A SPECIAL POSITION IN RELATION TO THE EXCHANGE FUND. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THAT, WITHOUT KNOWING WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY OBLIGATIONS ON THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN THE AGREEMENT, WE SHOULD COMMIT OURSELVES TO BRING TO PASS IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING 1997, WHATEVER THEY MAY STIPULATE ON THIS QUESTION IN THE BASIC LAW. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND CHIEF OFFICIALS OF AT LEAST THE FIRST SAR GOVERNMENT WILL BE CHOSEN THROUGH CONSULTATIONS RATHER THAN BY ELECTION.

*Very worrying - shows their true colours*  
*MF*

SECRET

/ 3. ZHOU

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3. ZHOU DID STATE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY IN HONG KONG UP TO 1997, THAT THE CHINESE WOULD ACTIVELY COOPERATE WITH US TO SECURE THIS END AND THAT THE MACHINERY WHICH THEY PROPOSED WOULD BE FOR LIAISON PURPOSES AND NOT AN ORGAN OF POWER. BUT HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT WHAT COULD NOT BE AGREED IN THE LIAISON GROUP SHOULD BE REFERRED UPWARDS FOR NEGOTIATION. THIS CONFLICTS WITH THE STATEMENT THAT WE SHALL BE FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HONG KONG UNTIL 1997.

4. CAREFUL THOUGHT NEEDS TO BE GIVEN ON HOW TO REPLY TO THESE PROPOSALS. SEE MIFT

EVANS

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<sup>2</sup>  
SECRET

GRS 2225

SECRET

13

SECRET

DESKBY 111100Z

MF

FROM PEKING 110915Z APR 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 702 OF 11/4/84 OF 11/4/84

INFOR IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: 12TH ROUND OF TALKS: FIRST DAY

SUMMARY

1. ZHOU OPENED DISCUSSION ON ITEMS TWO AND THREE. HE PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT IN HONG KONG OF CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY. HE SET FORWARD CHINESE IDEAS ON MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT. I SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF EARLIER CHINESE STATEMENTS ON CIVIL AVIATION AND SHIPPING AND SPOKE BRIEFLY ON NATIONALITY.

DETAIL

2. ZHOU RECALLED THAT DURING THE ELEVEN ROUNDS SPENT DISCUSSING AGENDA ITEM 1 THE TWO SIDES HAD REACHED A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE CHINESE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CHINESE SIDE HAD SET FORTH THEIR TWELVE GUIDELINES AND HAD ANSWERED VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED IN OUR WORKING PAPERS. THE CHINESE SIDE BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON MAJOR ISSUES, PROVIDING A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. HE RECALLED THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAT WE WOULD BEGIN TODAY DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEM 2, AND THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD SUGGESTED THAT ITEMS 2 AND 3 SHOULD BE TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION. THE BRITISH HAD RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THIS. OF COURSE, THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT CERTAIN QUESTIONS REMAINING FROM ITEM 1 COULD STILL BE DISCUSSED AT SUITABLE LENGTH. THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE BRITISH IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING ITEMS 2 AND 3 IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN POSITIVE RESULTS. IF THE TWO SIDES PURSUED THEIR TALKS IN THE SAME SPIRIT IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO REACH A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE.

SECRET

/ 3. ZHOU

3. ZHOU THEN OFFERED SOME BASIC CHINESE IDEAS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND FOR THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST OF THE 12 CHINESE GUIDELINES STATED THAT CHINA WOULD RESUME THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG FROM 1 JULY 1997 AND THAT THE TIME UP UNTIL 1997 WAS THE TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE HONG KONG QUESTION. THE TRANSITION PERIOD WOULD BEGIN AT THE DATE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WAS REACHED BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN AND WOULD END OF 30 JUNE 1997. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD WAS THAT BRITAIN WOULD THROUGHOUT HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN HONG KONG, THAT CHINA WOULD ACTIVELY COOPERATE TO SECURE THIS END, AND THAT CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD CO-OPERATE TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT SO AS TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN HONG KONG. DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD BOTH CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING HARMFUL TO STABILITY AND PROSPERITY AND SHOULD WORK ENTHUSIASTICALLY FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC GROWTH IN HONG KONG.

4. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THE CHINESE SIDE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO SECURE A GOOD SETTLEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD:

(I) CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD COOPERATE TO ENSURE THAT HONG KONG REMAINED A SEPARATE TARIFF AREA AND MAINTAINED ITS EXISTING ECONOMIC RELATIONS. CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH THE COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED TO ENABLE HONG KONG AFTER 1997 TO CONTINUE TO ENJOY PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, SEPARATE QUOTAS AND TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF ASSOCIATE MEMBER OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

(II) AS THE HONG KONG DOLLAR WOULD CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE AFTER 1997, BRITAIN SHOULD KEEP CHINA INFORMED OF THE ISSUE OF CURRENCY, OF THE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF THE EXCHANGE FUND, AND OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF NOTE ISSUING BANKS. THE HONG KONG BRANCH OF THE BANK OF CHINA SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE EXCHANGE FUND AND ONE OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE HONG KONG ASSOCIATION OF BANKS.

(III) TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC STABILITY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES HAD AN OBLIGATION TO SOLVE PROPERLY THE DEFICIT ACCUMULATED IN RECENT YEARS. BRITAIN SHOULD KEEP CHINA INFORMED IN GOOD TIME OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AND RELEVANT MEASURES TAKEN.

(IV) CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD COOPERATE SO THAT OTHER MATTERS CONDUCTIVE TO THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG COULD BE WELL HANDLED.

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5. THE CHINESE SIDE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SET UP A PERMANENT SINO-BRITISH JOINT GROUP OR COMMITTEE IN HONG KONG DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THIS SHOULD BE A LIAISON BODY AND NOT AN ORGAN OF POWER. ITS TASKS WOULD BE TO COORDINATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINO-BRITISH AGREEMENT AND TO DISCUSS CONCRETE MEASURES FOR THE SMOOTH TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT. ISSUES THAT THE JOINT GROUP WAS UNABLE TO SETTLE SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A HIGHER LEVEL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE JOINT GROUP SHOULD CONSIST OF REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EACH SIDE, HEADED BY AN OFFICIAL OF AMBASSADORIAL RANK. IN VIEW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMPLEXITY AND IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY MATTERS IN HONG KONG, THE JOINT GROUP COULD SET UP A FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUB-GROUP, PLUS POSSIBLY A FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS SUB-GROUP, TO STUDY THESE MATTERS AND OFFER ADVICE TO THE JOINT GROUP. IN ADDITION, SUB-GROUPS FOR SECURITY, PERSONNEL, LAND AND ENTRY AND EXIT COULD BE FORMED IF NECESSARY. TO ENSURE THE SMOOTH OPERATION OF THE JOINT GROUP, THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES SHOULD PROVIDE FACILITIES TO THE GROUP AND ITS SUB-GROUPS, INCLUDING UP TO DATED INFORMATION, RELATED DATA, POLICY PAPERS AND SO ON . THESE REPRESENTED GENERAL CHINESE IDEAS FOR SETTING UP JOINT GROUPS.

6. AS FOR THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT, THE CHINESE SIDE BELIEVED THAT CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSFER AND AVOID DISLOCATION WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN HONG KONG. THE TRANSITION PERIOD WOULD BE ROUGHLY DIVIDED INTO TWO STAGES:

(I) FROM NOW UNTIL ABOUT 1993, IN OTHER WORDS BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE BASIC LAW. DURING THIS PERIOD BRITAIN SHOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDE CHINA WITH DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORK OF VARIOUS HONG KONG GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. CHINA WOULD FORMULATE THE BASIC LAW DURING THIS PERIOD.

(II) FROM ABOUT 1994 UNTIL THE END OF JUNE 1997. IN THIS PERIOD THE BASIC LAW WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED AND 1997 WOULD BE DRAWING CLOSE, SO THE TASKS THAT SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE BASIC LAW CHINA AND BRITAIN SHOULD, THROUGH CONSULTATION, REFORM STEP BY STEP THE LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN HONG KONG TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BASIC LAW. THIS WORK SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE 1 JULY 1997.

(B) THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND OTHER PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE FIRST GOVERNMENT OF THE SAR WOULD BE CHOSEN BY VARIOUS

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CIRCLES IN HONG KONG THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTED TO THE CENTRAL PEOPLES GOVERNMENT FOR APPROVAL. FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR APPOINTMENT THEY WOULD ASSUME OFFICE ON 1 JULY 1997.

(C) THE PATTERN AND DESIGN OF THE SAR'S FLAG, EMBLEM, BANK NOTES AND STAMPS WOULD BE DRAWN UP AND FINALISED.

(D) THE REVISION OF HONG KONG LAWS IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE BASIC LAW SHOULD BEGIN, THOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS WORK BEFORE 1 JULY 1997.

(E) OTHER NECESSARY REFORMS

7. ZHOU CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THESE CHINESE IDEAS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. IN THE CHINESE VIEW, THEY ACCORDED WITH THE REALITIES OF HONG KONG, WERE CONDUCTIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, AND SHOULD NOT BE INCONVENIENT FOR THE BRITISH SIDE. HE HOPED FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE.

8. I SAID ZHOU HAD MADE A VERY IMPORTANT STATEMENT. WE WOULD STUDY IT WITH THE GREAT CARE AND ATTENTION IT DESERVED. I THEN SPOKE ON CIVIL AVIATION AND SHIPPING, USING RESPECTIVELY THE TEXTS IN YOUR TEL NO 652 TO HONG KONG AND HONG KONG TEL NO 952 TO YOU, AMENDED BY YOUR TEL NO 347. FINALLY I SPOKE ON NATIONALITY, ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR TEL NO 340, ADDING THAT, FOLLOWING YOUR VISIT, THE TWO SIDES COULD NO DOUBT RESUME DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT THE NEXT ROUND.

9. ZHOU THANKED ME FOR MY STATEMENTS. HE NOTED MY REMARK THAT WE WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY CHINESE IDEAS ON THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE MIGHT RESPOND TOMORROW. AS FOR CIVIL AVIATION AND SHIPPING, THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD LOOK CAREFULLY AT WHAT I HAD SAID. IT WAS POSSIBLE THEY WOULD RESPOND ON THESE MATTERS TOMORROW. HE INTENDED TOMORROW TO FOCUS ON TWO MATTERS:

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SECRET

/ (1) A FURTHER



# SECRET

(I) A FURTHER EXPLANATION AND ELABORATION OF CHINESE POLICIES  
RELATING TO MATTERS COVERED IN THE WORKING PAPER ON LAND.

(II) THE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG  
AFTER 1997.

ZHOU PRESSED ME AS TO WHAT I WOULD BE SAYING TOMORROW. I SAID  
I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE ANY UNDERTAKINGS. I NOTED HIS  
HOPE THAT WE WOULD RESPOND TOMORROW ON THE TRANSITION PERIOD  
BUT SAID THAT ALL I COULD GUARANTEE WAS THAT WE WOULD STUDY  
EXTREMELY CAREFULLY WHAT ZHOU HAD SAID

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