

GR700

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 292315Z JUN 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 667 OF 29 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, CBF

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STRASBOURG

YOUR TELNO 186 TO NICOSIA: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL DETERMINED TO RUN WITH THE CYPRUS BALL HIMSELF, THOUGH NOT UNTIL AFTER 20 JULY. APPROACH WILL BE COMPREHENSIVE NOT PARTIAL BUT VAROSHA MAY BE SINGLED OUT. HE DOES NOT EXCLUDE A VISIT TO CYPRUS.

DETAIL

2. AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL LEAVES TOMORROW FOR A LENGTHY OVERSEAS TRIP THAT WILL KEEP HIM OUT OF NEW YORK UNTIL 19 JULY I ASKED TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING TO TALK ABOUT CYPRUS THOUGH THIS HAD TO BE IN ADVANCE OF YOUR REACTION TO MY TELNO 651 (NOT TO ALL).

3. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS BUT IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF MANY COMMUNICATIONS BOTH FROM AND TO MY CAPITAL. HE HAD SAID HE WANTED TO INVOKE THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UK AND THE US (AND THE RUSSIANS, HE INTERJECTED, BECAUSE OF THEIR LEVERAGE IN NICOSIA). WE WERE VERY KEEN TO COOPERATE WITH HIM. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE MUST BE HIS AND WE DID NOT WISH TO BE TOO VISIBLE. BUT WE DID WANT TO GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO HAVE HIS TIMETABLE SO THAT WE COULD GEAR OUR APPROACHES TO THE PARTIES TO HIS PROGRAMME.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HIS PLAN WAS TO PUT FORWARD HIS PROPOSALS AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST. THIS WAS LATER THAN HE WOULD HAVE WISHED ('WE HAVE TO RUSH') BUT THERE WAS NO POINT IN DOING ANYTHING BEFORE THE 20 JULY ANNIVERSARY OF THE TURKISH INVASION. ONCE THAT DUST HAD SETTLED HE INTENDED TO SEND MESSAGES TO KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. IF THEIR REACTION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRUCTIVE HE MIGHT INVITE THEM TO MEET HIM IN PROXIMITY TALKS IN VIENNA (WHERE HE WILL BE AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST FOR THE MEETING OF UNIDO). IF THERE WAS ENOUGH PROGRESS HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO AT A LATER STAGE TO CYPRUS FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A COMMON DECLARATION ON SOME BASIC POINTS (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THIS SOUNDED LIKE 'A KIND OF DREAM'). HE HAD IN MIND TO PUT FORWARD VERY CONCRETE IDEAS IN TERRITORY AND THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT TRYING TO COVER EVERYTHING.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/ 5.

## CONFIDENTIAL

5. I SAID THAT HIS THINKING APPEARED TO BE CLOSE TO OURS. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PREVENT THINGS GETTING WORSE. IT WAS FRUITLESS TO TRY TO OBTAIN PROMISES FROM ONE SIDE TO ABSTAIN FROM CONSOLIDATING UDI AND THE OTHER TO ABSTAIN FROM REVERTING TO INTERNATIONALISM. BUT HE COULD SAY THAT HE WAS CONDUCTING HIS GOOD OFFICES IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD SO ABSTAIN. WE THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED GENTLY STARTING WITH THINGS THEY BOTH ACCEPTED, EG THAT THE OUTCOME SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CYPRUS, EDGING OUT FROM THIS TO TERRITORIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. IT WAS VITAL THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REJECT HIS IDEAS STRAIGHT OFF. ACCORDINGLY HE SHOULD BUILD FROM SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS TO DETAILED PROPOSALS FEELING HIS WAY ABOUT WHICH POINTS TO CONCENTRATE UPON AT ANY GIVEN TIME. BUT THERE WAS NOT A LOT OF TIME BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECOGNISED THIS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL ON BOTH TIMING AND SUBSTANCE. HE WANTED TO CONSULT THE PARTIES WITHOUT PROVOKING EXTREME COUNTER PROPOSALS. THE FIRST GREAT DIFFICULTY WAS THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRE-CONDITION ABOUT THE REVERSAL OF UDI. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT THERE WERE SOME ELEMENTS ON THE GREEK SIDE, ON BOTH EXTREME LEFT AND EXTREME RIGHT, TRYING TO UNDERMINE HIS PROPOSALS EVEN BEFORE KNOWING WHAT THEY WERE. THE ONLY SUPPORT HE COULD EXPECT WAS FROM THE MODERATE LEFT AND MODERATE RIGHT. BUT HE WOULD TRY TO GET SOMETHING ON VAROSHA IN WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE VERY INTERESTED AND TO WHICH THE ERTEKUN PAPER HAD REFERRED.

7. I ASKED HIM TO TELL US WHEN IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE AND/OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR US TO INTERVENE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ONCE HE PRESENTED HIS PROPOSALS HE MIGHT NEED OUR ASSISTANCE TO HELP PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO REACT POSITIVELY TO THEM. "YOU ARE THE MOST HELPFUL COUNTRY TO US ON CYPRUS".

8. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MANAGE ALL THIS HIMSELF. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IN ORDER TO DRAMATISE HIS INVOLVEMENT HE WANTED TO BE BOTH AUTHOR AND ACTOR AT LEAST IN THE EARLY STAGES. THEREAFTER HE WOULD APPOINT A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. I COMMENTED THAT HOLGER APPEARED TO BE DOING WELL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED BUT SAID THAT AN ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REAL THING.

COMMENT

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

/ 9.

# CONFIDENTIAL

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS SHOWING ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF ROBUSTNESS ON THE ISSUE. BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT HE WILL TRY TO GO TOO FAR TOO FAST. HE WILL NEED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO FRIGHTEN ONE OR OTHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES OFF BY BEING TOO PRECISE ON TOO MANY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AT THE BEGINNING.

10. I ASKED MY HEAD OF CHANCERY TO REINFORCE THIS POINT WITH PICCO SUBSEQUENTLY. PICCO TOLD GORE-BOOTH THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO FIND THE RIGHT MIX OF GENERALITIES AND SPECIFICS. HIS REFERENCE TO CONCRETE IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT HIS PROPOSALS WOULD BE SET IN CONCRETE AT THE OPENING STAGE. THIS WOULD BE A 'PRISE DE CONTACT' AND WOULD BE COINED IN GENERAL TERMS. THE CONCRETE WOULD BE POURED IN AS HE WENT ALONG. PICCO EMPHASISED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS WORKING ON THE PROPOSALS HIMSELF AND WOULD BE DEVOTING HIMSELF TO THEM AS MUCH AS HE COULD DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP (ON WHICH PICCO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING HIM).

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

## LIMITED

SED  
UND  
CCD  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
DEF D  
CONS D  
ECD(E)  
ERD  
CLAIMS D  
WED  
INFO D  
CRD  
APD  
NAD

MAED  
NENAD  
MED  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
TRED  
EED  
SOV D  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MF RIFKIND  
PS/MF LUCE

PS/MF WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
MR GOODALL  
SIR C TICKELL  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR. O'NEILL  
MR WESTON  
MR EGERTON  
MF RENWICK  
MF J THOMAS  
MR JENKINS  
MF MILES  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CYPRUS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED