

CONFIDENTIAL



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BPP

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 December 1984

Cyprus

Thank you for your letter of 6 December enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Kyprianou's earlier message.

The Prime Minister has approved the reply in slightly amended form. I enclose the revised version and should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

Thank you very much for your letter of 5 December giving me your views on the position reached in discussion of the UN Secretary General's proposals.

I have continued to follow developments closely since we last met. The Secretary General has our full support in the efforts he is making. I have been encouraged by the relative improvement in the position of the Turkish side to which you refer; your own determination to persevere with the negotiations until a substantive agreement is reached; and your judgement that prospects for a solution are better than at any time since 1974. I quite agree that a high level meeting must have a successful outcome. I know that patience and courage will be needed on all sides over the coming weeks. But I believe that there is an opportunity for a solution which must not be missed. You have my every good wish for your efforts to make the most of that opportunity.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1984

The proposed draft  
reply to Kyprianou is  
very bland. That may be  
wise: we do not want to  
get drawn in too deeply.

Dear Charles,

I have sharpened  
up the draft a bit.  
Cyprus

Agall revised  
draft?CJP  
6/xii

I enclose a copy of a 'Personal and Confidential' letter dated 5 December from President Kyprianou to the Prime Minister, contained in Nicosia telegram No 549 of 5 December which has been copied to you.

President Kyprianou's letter should be seen against the background of a set of proposals put to both sides by the UN Secretary General for a high level agreement. Following representations by the Americans and ourselves, the Turkish Cypriots have claimed that they are ready to accept the Secretary General's draft in toto. But, as his letter makes clear, President Kyprianou is still worried about several areas: he has therefore been placed in a difficult tactical position. Acceptance of the Secretary General's proposals as they stand risks leading to strong criticism at home (since they would certainly not satisfy all the various pressure groups); while pressing for modifications would make him appear to international opinion (on which he sets great store) to be less flexible than the Turkish Cypriots. The third round of proximity talks is now in recess to enable President Kyprianou to consult in Nicosia and in Athens. His letter is evidently intended to ensure that we are aware of the problems he faces and to improve the position into which the Turkish Cypriots have manoeuvred him.

We would agree that some of the Secretary General's proposals pose genuine difficulties for the Greek Cypriots: particularly, for example, the proposed Turkish Cypriot veto powers which, unless there is considerable political will on both sides, could make any future federal government unworkable. But we should avoid comment in detail: our views might well become known and we might be drawn into the role of mediator. A swift reply would facilitate this. I accordingly enclose a draft reply in the form of a telegram to Nicosia which alludes to the positive parts of President Kyprianou's message and gives him general encouragement to pursue the process.

/I would

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I would be grateful for approval to inform selected posts, including UKMIS New York, of the contents of President Kyprianou's message and to authorise Sir J Thomson to give a general account of the letter and of the Prime Minister's reply in confidence to the UN Secretary General as he would be likely to find this valuable in conducting his negotiations.

*Yours ever,  
L V Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 YOUR TELNO 549: CYPRUS: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU  
 10 TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
 11 1. Please convey the following message from the Prime Minister  
 12 to President Kyprianou in response to his message in TUR.  
 13 BEGINS  
 14 Thank you very much for your letter of 5 December giving  
 15 me your views on the position reached in discussion of the UN  
 16 Secretary General's proposals.  
 17 I have <sup>continued to</sup> been following developments closely since we last  
 18 met. ~~Difficult problems have had to be faced and it is clear~~  
 19 ~~that more remains to be done.~~ The Secretary General has our full  
 20 support in the efforts he is making. I have been encouraged by  
 21 the relative improvement in the position of the Turkish side to  
 22 which you refer; your own determination to persevere with the  
 23 negotiations until a substantive agreement is reached; and your  
 24 judgement that prospects for a solution are better than at any  
 25 time since 1974. I quite agree that a high level meeting must

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File number		Dept SED	Distribution CYPRUS LIMITED Additional Cyprus
Drafted by (Block capitals) DR R BARKER			
Telephone number 233-4189			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	<b>IMMEDIATE</b>	Page <b>2</b>
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 have a successful outcome. ~~I shall of course continue~~  
~~to keep in close touch with developments.~~ I know that  
 patience and courage will be needed on all sides over  
 the coming weeks. You have my every good wish for your  
 efforts to ~~secure our common objective of real progress~~  
~~towards a settlement.~~ ENDS

*But I believe that there is an opportunity for a solution which must not be missed*

*Need -  
not*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 549 OF 5 DECEMBER 84.

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Please advise distribution  
of 5/12  
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233-8688

CYPRUS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER HANDED ME THIS MORNING (5 DECEMBER) A 'PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL' LETTER OF THE SAME DATE FROM PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THIS PROBABLY SHOWS WHAT KYPRIANOU HAD ORIGINALLY WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BY TELEPHONE ON 4 DECEMBER (MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH POWELL OF NO 10).

2. TEST IS AS FOLLOWS :

'DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I FELT THAT I MUST FIRST OF ALL EXPRESS TO YOU MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR KEEN PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WHICH WAS VERY CLEAR TO ME IN THE COURSE OF OUR SEVERAL MEETINGS OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS.

I TRUST THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING IN LONDON. I HAD ASKED OUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO KEEP YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR JOHN THOMSON, FULLY INFORMED OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS IN NEW YORK.

I FEEL THAT THE RELATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH SIDE CANNOT BE UNRELATED TO YOUR EFFORTS. ALTHOUGH, THIS IMPROVEMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A BREAKTHROUGHT, I MUST SAY THAT I AM ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT PROSPECTS FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ARE NOW BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME BEFORE SINCE 1974.

IN VIEW OF THIS CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE INITIATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND FURTHER TO OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF OUR CONCERNS AND THOUGHTS.

THERE CANNOT BE ANY DOUBT OF YOUR SPECIAL INTEREST IN A REASONABLE AND WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, AS WELL AS OF BRITAIN'S UNIQUE EXPERIENCE IN THE WORKINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WERE FACED WITH PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF CYPRUS.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ENSURE STABILITY. GOOD SENSE, TOLERANCE AND COOPERATION WILL CLEARLY BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, A POWER OF VETO ON ALL DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE, APART FROM BEING OBJECTIONABLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PRINCIPLE AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS, IT WOULD CERTAINLY RENDER THE SYSTEM TOTALLY UNWORKABLE AND WILL UNAVOIDABLY LEAD TO FRICTION, DISUNITY AND INSTABILITY WITH PREDICATBLY DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. WE RECONGISE THAT A SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AND WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THIS EFFECT. WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE A LIST OF SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS ON MATTERS WHICH MAY BE REASONABLY CONSIDERED AS OE SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.



AS REGARDS THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT WE STRESSED THE NEED THAT AREAS THAT ARE "RETURNED" SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH POPULATION CENTRES AS WOULD ALLOW SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES UNDER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION. YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE THE BITTERNESS OF THOSE OF OUR FELLOW CITIZENS WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES UNDER THEIR OWN REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION. APART FROM OBVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE, WE ARE PREOCCUPIED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SUCH DISSATISFIED DISPLACED PERSONS. THE LARGER THEIR NUMBER THE LARGER THE PERMANENT DAMAGE TO THE POLITICAL FABRIC OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE GREATER THE PROBABILITY OF INSTABILITY IN THE FUTURE.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT POPULATION CENTRES IS VAROSHA. ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ONLY ABOUT 15,000 PEOPLE OR ONE THIRD OF THE TOWN WILL BE "RETURNED" FOR RESETTLEMENT BY ITS INHABITANTS. IN STATEMENTS MADE IN THE PAST BY MR DENKTASH ON ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN A FIGURE OF 35,000 WAS USED. MR. EDJEVIT IN A STATEMENT IN JUNE, 1978, STATED THAT THE NUMBER OF FORMER INHABITANTS RETURNING WOULD BE 30,000. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN PROPOSAL OF 1978 IMPLIED THE RETURN OF 32,000. THE RETURN OF THE INHABITANTS OF VAROSHA WAS PART OF THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT OF MAY, 1979, THE VALIDITY OF WHICH WAS RECENTLY RE-AFFIRMED IN NEW YORK BY BOTH SIDED. I RECALL WELL THAT THE THEN SECRETARY-GENERAL DR. KURT WALDHEIM IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRESENT SECRETARY-GENERAL (THEN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE) MR. DE CUELLAR REBUKED MR. DENTASH FOR DARING TO SUGGEST ANOTHER DIVIDED CITY. EXCUSES, SUCH AS "SECURITY", ARE INADMISSIBLE AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A FEDERAL SOLUTION MUST BE BASED. BY MAKING THIS SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VAROSHA IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT OTHER POPULATION CENTRES ARE NOT IMPORTANT.

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REACHED.

WITH MY BEST WISHES,  
SPYROS KYPRIANOU  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. ''

3. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO AUTHORISE ANY REPETITION. THE  
ORIGINAL LETTER IS IN TODAY'S BAG FROM HERE.

WILBERFORCE

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ADVANCE COPIES 15

CYPRUS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR JENKINS

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T206/84

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 549 OF 5 DECEMBER 84.

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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. "

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