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TELEGRAM NUMBER 46 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA, WASHINGTON.

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SUMMARY

1. THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BE SALVAGED PROVIDED PRESSURE IS PUT ON KYPRIANOU TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TEXT, PERHAPS WITH SOME PRESENTATIONAL CHANGES.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON MY TURKISH COLLEAGUE TO SAY GOODBYE (HE LEAVES ON 29 JANUARY AND TURKMEN ARRIVES THE NEXT DAY) AND TO ASK FOR HIS ASSESSMENT.

3. KIRCA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S POLICY OF 'CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY' HAD NOT WORKED AND THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY ROOM FOR AMBIGUITY. KYPRIANOU HAD MADE DENKTASH EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD EVEN SAID IN FRONT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HE AND DENKTASH UNDERSTOOD DIFFERENT THINGS BY THE WORD 'ENDORSE'. IF DENKTASH WAS NOW ASKED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OR EVEN COSMETIC CHANGES IN THE DOCUMENT IT WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD RESPOND WITH PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN FOR CHANGES. AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE THERE WAS NOW NO ROOM FOR ANY ALTERATION BUT THERE COULD STILL BE A BIT OF FLEXIBILITY IN PRESENTATION TO SAVE KYPRIANOU'S FACE.

4. KIRCA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE TO HOLD ANOTHER SUMMIT UNLESS IT HAD BEEN SECURELY DETERMINED IN ADVANCE THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD ENDORSE THE PAPER AS IT STOOD. KIRCA WAS NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT HE MIGHT DO THIS ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE IT UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR IN THE PRIVATE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PAPER UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED AND THAT SINCE DENKTASH DID NOT AGREE THE TEXT WAS ALREADY FIXED. IT WAS A PITY AND DANGEROUS THAT HE PUSSYFOOTED IN PUBLIC BUT KIRCA BELIEVED THAT KYPRIANOU COULD NOT REALLY BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION NOW. IF A CAREFULLY PREPARED SUMMIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY ENDORSED THE PAPER KIRCA BELIEVED THAT DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO A PRESENTATION WHICH WOULD NOT RUB KYPRIANOU'S NOSE IN A CLIMB DOWN. THE ENDORSEMENT WOULD NOT INVOLVE A KYPRIANOU SIGNATURE. THE PAPER WOULD BE ANNEXED TO AN AGREED REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FURTHERMORE,

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IT COULD BE AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD MAKE AN UNCONTESTED UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT HE WAS ASKING HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MONITOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS VERY CAREFULLY AND TO REPORT BACK TO HIM AT A FIXED TIME, SAY THE END OF JUNE. THE STATEMENT WOULD CONTINUE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD CONSIDER IN THE LIGHT OF THAT REPORT WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HOLD A FURTHER SUMMIT MEETING AND IF SO HE WOULD PROPOSE A TIME, PLACE AND AGENDA. HOWEVER, IT WAS KIRCA'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO HOLD A SECOND SUMMIT MEETING QUICKLY AND IT TOO MUST BE PREPARED CAREFULLY IN ADVANCE.

5. AS REGARDS THE INTERNAL TURKISH POSITION, KIRCA SAID THAT DENKTASH WAS IN SOME DIFFICULTY. HIS POSITION ON THE PAPER WAS SUPPORTED BY HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES AND ATTACKED STRONGLY BY SOME OF HIS FRIENDS. IN ANKARA THE GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO IN DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION CHARGES AND WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A CYPRUS ROW TO GET CORRUPTION OFF THE FRONT PAGES. HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT PRESIDENT EVREN AND THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF HAD NOT YET CHANGED THEIR VIEW AND IT WAS UNDER THEIR PRESSURE THAT DENKTASH HAD BEEN READY TO ACCEPT THE DEAL. NEVERTHELESS, ANKARA WAS DISQUIETED BY THE RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO ATTRIBUTE BLAME EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOW TRYING TO ROW BACK A BIT. THE PUBLIC REFERENCES IN LONDON TO 'UNITARY' CYPRUS INSTEAD OF TO A 'UNIFIED' CYPRUS HAD ALSO CAUSED DISQUIET. DESPITE ALL THIS KIRCA THOUGHT THE TURKS WERE STILL READY FOR AN AGREEMENT BUT HE STRONGLY URGED RAPID ACTION BEFORE THIS SITUATION CHANGED. NOW WAS THE TIME FOR THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS TO CONVINCING KYPRIANOU THAT HE MUST ENDORSE THE PAPER AND GIVE SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, HOWEVER PRIVATELY, IN ADVANCE OF A RENEWED SUMMIT AT THE END OF FEBRUARY.

6. I ASKED WHAT THE CHANCES WERE THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD AGREE AND WHY HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE HE DID AT THE FAILED SUMMIT. KIRCA SAID HE WAS NOT WITHOUT HOPE. THE VERY FACT THAT KYPRIANOU HAD UNINTELLIGENTLY ATTACKED EVERY ASPECT OF THE PAPER MADE THE SITUATION RATHER EASIER THAN IF HE HAD SINGLE OUT 3 OR 4

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WELL CHOSEN POINTS ON WHICH TO CONCENTRATE. THE REASONS WHY KYPRIANOU HAD BAULKED AT ENDORSING THE PAPER WERE:

(A) IT WAS, OF COURSE, BASICALLY A TURKISH PLAN AND IT WOULD END THE GREEK CYPRIOT MONOPOLY OF REPRESENTING CYPRUS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(B) IN THE LONG TERM, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BELIEVED THAT TURKEY WOULD FALL APART UNDER SECTARIAN DIFFERENCES.

7. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY BY TELELETTER SEVERAL OF KIRCA'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE FAILED SUMMIT. AS TO THE FUTURE, I AM INCLINED TO TAKE SERIOUSLY HIS ADVICE THAT PRESSURE IS NEEDED ON KYPRIANOU BEFORE THE TURKISH ATTITUDE CHANGES.

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