

SALT FILE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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UK/SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS : BRIEFING AT N A COUNCIL
BY U S TEAM 11 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, TOWER AND GLITMAN TODAY BRIEFED THE N A C ON THE U S OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH TO THE RENEWED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH START TOMORROW. THE BRIEFING WAS IN GENERAL TERMS. IT INDICATED A TOUGH APPROACH TO SPACE AND DEFENCE WEAPONS AND CONTINUITY, WITH FLEXIBILITY, FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS. EMPHASIS IN DISCUSSION ON SOLIDARITY BUT CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE. NO DELAY EXPECTED BY U S TEAM BECAUSE OF CHERNENKO'S DEATH BUT THEY WOULD ACCOMMODATE THE RUSSIANS IF REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. INTRODUCING THE OVERALL U S OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD SEEK AN OUTCOME PROVIDING FOR INCREASED STABILITY AND DETERRENCE. THE TEAM HAD BEEN GIVEN FLEXIBILITY TO ACHIEVE THIS AND THE LEADER OF EACH U S GROUP WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

3. THE U S WAS PREPARED FOR SERIOUS GIVE AND TAKE. IN THE FIRST ROUND THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ULTIMATE AIM WAS THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO SEEK NOW EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS. THE US WOULD MAKE CLEAR ITS CONCERN AT THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY AND SET OUT U S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR A FUTURE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENCE. THE 3 NEGOTIATING AREAS WERE NATURALLY RELATED BUT THE U S WOULD RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH LINKAGES WHICH COULD BLOCK PROGRESS. SOVIET PROPAGANDA INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT THIS BUT THE U S HOPED TO CONVINCe THEM THAT REDUCTIONS COULD BE MADE WHICH WERE VALID IN THEIR OWN RIGHT.

4. THE U S TEAM WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE IN ORDER TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND OF THE OBSERVATION OF AGREEMENTS.

5. ON SPACE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THE U S WOULD REBUT SOVIET VIEWS OF THE SDI AND ANY ATTEMPT TO CONSTRAIN RESEARCH. IT WAS A MIS-PERCEPTION THAT ONLY THE U S WAS UNDERTAKING RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD: ACTIVE SOVIET INTEREST WAS OF LONGSTANDING, INCLUDING ONE CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY (THE ABALAKOVO RADAR) AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES. THESE WOULD BE RAISED TO POINT OUT THE INACCURACY OF SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT U S ACTIVITIES. THE U S TEAM WOULD REJECT SOVIET CHARGES THAT THE U S WAS TRYING TO BUILD A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY AND WOULD STRESS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO DEFENCE COULD NOT BE IGNORED AND THAT IT WAS THE GROWTH AND PROLIFERATION IN LARGE SOVIET MIRVED ICBMS THAT UNDERMINED STRATEGIC STABILITY. SDI RESEARCH WAS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND NEW TECHNOLOGY MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER DETERRENCE AND STABILITY.

6. IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME NOT LEAST FROM GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS IN GENEVA THAT THE PRIMARY SOVIET OBJECTIVE WOULD BE A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS AND THAT THEY WOULD SEEK TO LINK THIS WITH PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS. THE U S SIDE WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PURSUED STRATEGIC DEFENCE FOR DECADES AND THAT THE U S HAD NONETHELESS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE U S WOULD ALSO POINT TO THE EXISTING BODY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WEAPONS IN SPACE (LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, OUTER SPACE TREATY, ABM TREATY) ARGUABLY A MORE RESTRICTIVE REGIME THAN EXISTED ON EARTH.

7. SHOULD THE SOVIET PROPOSE A BAN THE U S WOULD PRESS THEM ON POINTS DEALING WITH DEFINITIONS AND VERIFICATION (E.G. HOW TO ELIMINATE THE ASAT CAPABILITY INHERENT IN OTHER SYSTEMS OR TO VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF THE CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEMS. THE U S EXPECTED THAT A MORATORIUM ON ASAT'S WOULD BE PROPOSED; THEY WOULD REJECT THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT GIVEN THE EXISTING SOVIET SYSTEM, A MORATORIUM WOULD PERPETUATE AN ASYMETRY. OTHER MEASURES OF INTERIM CONSTRAINT WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR MERITS.

8. REFERRING TO NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE SYSTEMS GLITMAN RECALLED THE POSITION REACHED IN NOVEMBER 1983. THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONVERGENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND AIRCRAFT BUT NONE ON MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON ICBM SYSTEMS OR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

SOME CONVERGENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND AIRCRAFT BUT NONE ON MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON LRINF SYSTEMS OR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. HOWEVER IN JANUARY 1985 GROMYKO HAD NOT DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF U S LRINF AS A PRECONDITION, BUT HAD CALLED FOR A MORATORIUM TO BE FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED LIMIT. HE HAD NOT RULED OUT THE SANCTIONING OF SOME U S DEPLOYMENT WHICH SUGGESTED A CHANGE OF HEART. THE U S WOULD EXPLORE THIS. THE SOVIET SIDE WERE LIKELY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AND THE U S WOULD MAINTAIN ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO THEIR INCLUSION.

9. THE U S WOULD AIM TO MOVE INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY WOULD CONFIRM THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION, BUT WOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO BUILD UPON THE AUTUMN 1983 POSITION.

10. THE SOVIETS MIGHT HOWEVER DIG IN AND LAUNCH A NEW PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO DRIVE WEDGES, POSSIBLY BASED UPON THEIR SO-CALLED COUNTER MEASURES. CONTINUING STEADFASTLY IN IMPLEMENTING BOTH PARTS OF THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION WOULD BE THE ALLIANCE'S BEST ASSET.

11. TOWER REVIEWED THE RESPECTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AS THEY WERE IN 1983. THE U S POSITION WOULD BE BASED ON CONTINUITY IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE AIMS, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE BEING BIG REDUCTIONS IN DESTABILISING WEAPONS. THEY WOULD PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE REDUCTION OF WARHEADS (INITIALLY TO 5,000 WARHEADS ON MISSILES) AND THE LEVEL OF DESTRUCTIVE POWER. THEY WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THE PACE AND MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS PROVIDED THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY WAS NOT UNDERMINED. THEY WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN AREAS OF RELATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR EXAMPLE, HEAVY MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THEY WOULD SEEK TO RE-ESTABLISH THE WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

12. IN THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE U S NEGOTIATING TEAM, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF CONSULTATIONS IN ACHIEVING THIS. WIECK (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SALT III WOULD BE RAISED AND WHETHER THE DEATH OF CHERNENKO WOULD CASE A DELAY IN THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE U S TEAM REPLIED THAT SALT COMPLIANCE ISSUES WOULD BE RAISED SINCE THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD SEEK A DELAY BUT THE U S WOULD ACCOMMODATE THEM IF THIS AROSE.

13. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE TO HIS COUNTRY OF INF RECEIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION AND REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF SLCMS. HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OBSERVANCE OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE ABM TREATY.

14. I ASKED WHETHER A NEW CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS ENVISAGED AND HOPED THAT THE U S WOULD TAKE US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE. I REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR SDI RESEARCH AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PRESENT DETERRENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THEM. I ASKED WHETHER MORE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES COULD BE

SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN PUBLIC.

15. BERG (NORWAY) SAID THAT RESEARCH INTO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT AIM AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, ADVERSELY EFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT OR UNDERMINE DETERRENCE. AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE SHOULD BE AVOIDED, THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REVERSED. CURIEN (FRANCE) STRESSED THAT THE U S TEAM SHOULD REMEMBER THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WHICH WOULD REMAIN INDISPENSIBLE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS WAS IMPORTANT ALSO FOR GENERAL POLITICAL REASONS GIVEN THE SOVIET TENDENCY TO MARGINALISE EUROPE IN SUPER POWER RELATIONS. WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE DID NOT CROSS THE IRON CURTAIN. FRANCE ATTACHED THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE ABM TREATY. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT BE CAUSED FOR DEPLOYING COUNTRIES BY THE REFERENCES TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND STRESSED THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SDI FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRESENT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

16. TAYLOR (CANADA) ASKED FOR THE U S ASSESSMENT OF WHY THE SOVIETS RETURNED TO NEGOTIATIONS SEMICLN WHETHER THERE WAS ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT TRANSITION TO A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND HOW ONE WOULD JUDGE AT WHAT POINT THE RESULTS OF RESEARCH MIGHT BE EXCHANGED. ROMANO (ITALY) TOOK UP THIS QUESTION AND STRESSED THAT THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE PRESERVED.

17. IN REPLY KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THE U S TEAM WOULD ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS ASSUMING GOOD FAITH ON THE SOVIET PART, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO BE CONVINCED OF THIS AT THIS STAGE. THEY WOULD PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE SOVIET REACTION TO THIS WOULD GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THEIR INTENTION.

18. THE U S HOPED TO SOLVE PROCEDURAL ISSUES QUICKLY. THE U S WOULD THEN PROPOSE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BREAK INTO THE 3 GROUPS COVERING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN SUMMARY FASHION. THEY WOULD THEN HOPE TO RETURN TO CAPITALS TO EVALUATE ANY QUOTE SIGNALS UNQUOTE WHICH HAD EMERGED. THEY WOULD CONVEY A TONE OF SERIOUSNESS AND A DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE.

19. KAMPELMAN TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF THE REQUEST FOR MORE PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET BREAKOUT FROM TNE ABM TREATY. HE WOULD REFER THIS TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES.

20. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE EXTENT OF CONCERN ABOUT ISSUES FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PROBABLY EXCEEDED THE POLITENESS OF OBSERVATIONS MADE. HE UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED THIS CONCERN WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. SOONER OR LATER THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE ISSUE DIRECTLY.

21. IN HIS VIEW THE REASON FOR THE SOVIET RETURN WAS A COMBINATION OF THE REALISATION THAT THEIR WALKOUT HAD DAMAGED THEM AND FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OF U S EMPHASIS ON SDI.

FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND OF U S EMPHASIS ON SDI.
HE RECOGNISED THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION ON
SPACE WEAPONS, BUT IN HIS EXPERIENCE IT WOULD BE WISE NOT ^{TO} BE
BE OVER-INFLUENCED BY IT. CO-OPERATION IN RESEARCH WOULD HAVE
TO ARISE OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

22. IN A SURPRISING FINAL STATEMENT TOWER SAID THAT THE CURRENT
U S INTENTION WAS TO ADHERE TO SALT III CONSTRAINTS BUT TO KEEP
OPTIONS OPEN. THE U S STRATEGIC INTEREST LAY FIRMLY IN PRESERVING
OVERALL WESTERN SECURITY AND KEEPING A PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
THE DEFENCE OF THE U S BEGAN IN EUROPE. THERE SHOULD BE NO FEAR
OF DECOUPLING. IF THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ACHIEVED THIS WOULD FREE RESOURCES FOR
INTRODUCING IMPROVED HIGH TECHNOLOGY CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
IT WAS NATO'S TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD WHICH HAD PRESERVED
DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS BUT KAMPELMAN
APPEARED DISTINCTLY UNCOMFORTABLE.

23. FULL TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

GRAHAM

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