

HofC / HOC/MAD / Shover

GRS 1000

+ DELEGATION

Full Disposition	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Subjective Disposition	<input type="checkbox"/>
Approval	<input type="checkbox"/>
Examination	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Industrial	<input type="checkbox"/>
Env.	<input type="checkbox"/>

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 290110Z MAR 85
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1107 OF 28 MARCH
 INFO PRIORITY MODUK(FOR DACU), UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PS), UKDEL NATO,
 ROUTINE MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA AND
 UKDEL STOCKHOLM
 INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

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MIPT: SHULTZ'S AUSTIN SPEECH: SDI

1. FOLLOWING ARE KEY PASSAGES:-

A. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS DETERRENCE END SQUARE BRACKETS
 ''FOR AT LEAST THE PAST THIRTY YEARS, DETERRENCE HAS RESTED ON THE
 ULTIMATE THREAT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION: THE UNITED STATES
 AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE EACH BEEN HOSTAGE TO THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF
 THE OTHER. OUR RETALIATORY DETERRENT HAS ENABLE US TO LIVE IN PEACE
 WITH FREEDOM. WE STRIVE TO DETER WAR WITH THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF
 MILITARY POWER CONSISTENT WITH THAT PURPOSE. IF THERE IS NO
 ALTERNATIVE TO THE THREAT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION, THEN THIS
 IS THE NECESSARY AND MORAL COURSE. BUT IF, WITH ADEQUATE DEFENSES,
 WE COULD DENY THE POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR ANY HOPE OF ACHIEVING HIS
 OBJECTIVES THROUGH MILITARY POWER, SO THAT NEITHER SIDE'S POPULATION
 WAS AT RISK TO THE OTHER, THEN THAT WOULD BECOME THE PREFERABLE AND
 MORAL COURSE''.....

...''WE RECOGNISE THAT DETERRENCE WILL HAVE TO RELY ON THE THREAT
 OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION FOR MANY YEARS TO COME - THOUGH AT
SHARPLY REDUCED LEVELS, IF THE GENEVA TALKS SUCCEED. WITH THIS
 UNDERSTANDING, WE NOW BEGIN A MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT: THE SDI''

B. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS NITZE CRITERIA END SQUARE BRACKETS
 ''WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS SDI END SQUARE
 BRACKETS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT, SOMETIME IN
 THE NEXT DECADE, ON THE FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICALITY OF PROVIDING A
 SHIELD FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES AGAINST BALLISTIC
 MISSILES''.....

....''FEASIBILITY MEANS, FIRST, THAT ANY NEW DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS MUST
 BE REASONABLY SURVIVABLE: IF NOT, THEY MIGHT THEMSELVES BE TEMPTING
 TARGETS FOR A FIRST STRIKE. SECOND, IT MEANS NOT JUST THAT THE
 SYSTEMS MUST WORK, BUT THAT THEY MUST BE CHEAPER TO PRODUCE THAN
 WOULD BE THE NEW OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS NEEDED TO OVERCOME THEM. IN
 SHORT, THEY MUST BE COST-EFFECTIVE OTHERWISE IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO
 PRODUCE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN NUMBERS SUFFICIENT TO OVERWHELM THE
 DEFENSES''.....

''THE FEASIBILITY CRITERIA WE HAVE ADOPTED - SURVIVABILITY AND
 COST-EFFECTIVENESS - ARE DESIGNED PRECISELY TO ENSURE THAT ANY
TRANSITION PERIOD IS A STABLE ONE. THUS, SURVIVABILITY MEANS LESS
TEMPTATION AND INCENTIVE FOR EITHER SIDE TO ATTACK THESE NEW
 DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AT A MOMENT OF POLITICAL CRISIS DURING THE
 TRANSITION PERIOD. PHASING- IN OF TRULY COST-EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE
 SYSTEMS WILL MEAN THAT OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES - SUCH AS PILING UP
 MORE MISSILES TO SWAMP THE DEFENSES - ARE A LOSING GAME.''

C. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS CAMP DAVID END SQUARE BRACKETS
 ''SDI IS NOT A BID FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY: ON THE CONTRARY, IT
 WOULD MAINTAIN THE BALANCE, IN LIGHT OF THE RAPID SOVIET PROGRESS IN
 BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. NOR IS SDI AN ABROGATION OF
 THE ABM TREATY. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DIRECTED THAT THE RESEARCH

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PROGRAMME BE CARRIED OUT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. HE HAS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT ANY FUTURE DECISION TO DEPLOY DEFENSES THAT WERE NOT PERMITTED BY TREATY WOULD HAVE TO BE A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN GIVING THE SOVIET A VETO OVER OUR DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES, ANY MORE THAN THE SOVIETS HAVE A VETO OVER OUR CURRENT STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE PROGRAMS. BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS DOES REFLECT A RECOGNITION THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO MOVE FORWARD IN A COOPERATIVE MANNER WITH THE SOVIETS''..

D. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS EUROPEAN DEFENCE END SQUARE BRACKETS
''OUR SDI PROGRAMME IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE ALLIED AS WELL AS US SECURITY. A DECISION TO MOVE FROM RESEARCH TO DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE TAKEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. AS THE US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARSENALS DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY, WE WOULD SEEK TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN OTHER TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF WE COULD DEVELOP THE TECHNOLOGIES TO DEFEND AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES, WE COULD THEN TURN OUR ENERGIES TO THE PERFECTION OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THESE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE THE ELIMINATION OF THEM ALL.

BY NECESSITY, THIS IS A VERY LONG-TERM GOAL. FOR YEARS TO COME, WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO BASE DETERRENCE ON THE ULTIMATE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. AND THAT MEANS WE WILL CONTINUE OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMMES TO KEEP THE PEACE''.

E. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS CRITICISM OF SDI END SQUARE BRACKETS
''SOME ARGUE AGAINST SDI. THEY SAY THE BALANCE OF TERROR HAS WORKED, SO WHY TAMPER WITH IT? THEY ALSO SAY SDI WILL LEAD TO AN OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AS THE SOVIETS MOVE TO COUNTER OUR DEFENSES -- AS IF THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN ENGAGED FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS IN THE GREATEST OFFENSIVE BUILDUP IN HISTORY, ONE FAR BEYOND LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS. THESE CRITICS OVERLOOK TWO OTHER CENTRAL POINTS THE FIRST IS THAT THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS -- SUCH AS INCREASING MISSILE ACCURACY AND MOBILITY -- COULD OVER TIME UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE MUTUAL HOSTAGE RELATIONSHIP HAS RESTED. SDI IS A PRUDENT AND WISE INVESTMENT IN OUR FUTURE SAFETY. IT WOULD ENHANCE, NOT UNDERCUT, DETERRENCE.

THE SECOND POINT THE CRITICS OVERLOOK IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN VERSION OF AN SDI PROGRAM, AND HAVE HAD IT FOR YEARS, LONG BEFORE OURS. BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE ALLEGED ''MILITARIZATION OF SPACE'' YOU WILL FIND THE EXPENDITURES, THE MILITARY AND RESEARCH PERSONNEL, THE LABORATORIES, TESTING GROUNDS, AND WEAPONS OF AN AMBITIOUS SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM''.

F. BEGIN SQUARE BRACKETS KRASNOYARSK END SQUARE BRACKETS
''THE ABM TREATY LIMITS THE DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC-MISSILE EARLY-WARNING RADARS TO LOCATIONS ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY AND REQUIRES THAT THEY BE ORIENTED OUTWARD. AT KRASNOYARSK, ALMOST 400 MILES INSIDE THE FRONTIERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, A NEW RADAR, ORIENTED ACROSS SOVIET TERRITORY, IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN VIOLATION OF THE TREATY. OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITIES SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE PREPARING A NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE - AN ACTION WHICH, OF COURSE, WOULD ENTIRELY NEGATE THE ABM TREATY.''

WRIGHT

FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG
OTTAWA OSLO REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE

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