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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130055Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 292 OF 12 APRIL 1985

INFO PRIORITY BONN WASHINGTON NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA

INFO ROUTINE ROME PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO

MODUK (SEC (O) (C))

YOUR TELNO 116: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS CONVINCED THAT A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS AS CLOSE AS IT HAS EVER BEEN, BUT IS AFRAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WILL NOW MAKE 'FICULTY'. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME FORMALLY NEXT WEEK TO ASK FOR OUR INTERVENTION WITH THE TURKS.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS EVENING, 12 APRIL, HE TOLD ME THAT THE TURKISH AMBASSADORS IMMEDIATE REACTION EARLIER TODAY TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTATION HAD BEEN LESS THAN ENCOURAGING. ALTHOUGH TURKMEN HAD NOT BEEN SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS AFRAID THAT THE TURKS WERE LIKELY TO BE 'RATHER DIFFICULT' NOW. HE HAD TOLD TURKMEN THAT NO ONE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE REJECTION IN APRIL OF A PAPER ACCEPTED IN JANUARY BECAUSE OF CHANGES THAT WERE ONLY COSMETIC.

3. I TRIED TO ESTABLISH WHAT PARTICULAR POINTS OF DIFFICULTY TURKMEN HAD IDENTIFIED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO WAS CLEARLY SUFFERING THE AFTER EFFECTS OF HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST) WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AND UNDERTOOK TO ASK HIS STAFF TO LET ME AND MY AMERICAN AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES HAVE DETAILS IN WRITING OF THE POINTS THAT NEEDED TO BE TAKEN UP WITH THE TURKS. BUT HE MENTIONED THE QUESTIONS OF THE VETO POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT A DULPICATE OF THE DOCUMENTATION HE HAD HANDED TO TURKMEN WOULD BE PASSED TO DENKTASH BY HOLGER IN NICOSIA ON MONDAY, 15 APRIL. HE HOPED THAT A COMBINATION OF AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN PRESSURE WOULD KEEP DENKTASH ON BOARD. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE REFERENDUM ON 5 MAY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD LIKE TO STOP BOTH THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS THESE DID NOT IN FACT PREJUDICE A SOLUTION AND THEY SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THE ASSURANCES THEY HAD HAD ON THAT POINT. IN HIS VIEW SUCH CHANGES WITHIN THE TRNC DID NOT AFFECT THE FINAL OBJECTIVE. IN THIS, HE HAD TOLD TURKMEN THAT 'WE HAVE NEVER BEEN NEARER' AND THAT THE TURKISH SIDES WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF THEIR ANSWER WAS NEGATIVE. I ASKED WHAT TURKMEN HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DO. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS ON THE DOCUMENTATION TO ANKARA WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPEAL TO EVREN AND OZAL FOR SUPPORT ON THE BASIS THAT A BETTER DEAL WAS NOT OBTAINABLE.

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5. WHEN I ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY GENERALS ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES ON VAROSHA HE REPLIED IN A WAY WHICH SEEMED MILDLY ENCOURAGING. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD VERY DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THE AREA COMPRISING VAROSHA BUT HE ADDED THAT IT WAS A MATTER WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE SORTED OUT IN DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THEM. THE IMPLICATION SEEMED TO BE THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE. I WAS DISQUIETED, HOWEVER, BY HIS SUGGESTION THAT APART FROM VAROSHA A LOT OF NEGOTIATION LAY AHEAD ON THE 'QUALITY' OF THE LAND TO BE RESTORED.

6. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE FROM MR LUCE AND WAS GRATEFUL. HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH NEXT WEEK WHEN HE WAS READY TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO US TO INTERVENE WITH THE TURKISH SIDE.

THOMSON

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