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TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 5 JUNE.

SECRET

*Important for  
your talk with  
George Shultz*

18

*CDP*

FOLLOWING TO PRIVATE OFFICE FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL MEETING: SALT II CONSTRAINTS  
SUMMARY

SHULTZ ASKED FOR THE COMMENTS OF THE THREE OTHER MINISTERS ON THE  
OPTIONS FACING PRESIDENT REAGAN. GENSCHER, DUMAS AND SECRETARY OF  
STATE ALL ARGUED FOR RESPECT OF EXISTING CONSTRAINTS. SHULTZ WILL  
REPORT THERE REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. DECISION LIKELY ON  
SUNDAY.

*mt*

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ BEGAN BY ASKING THE OTHER MINISTERS FOR THEIR COMMENTS  
ON THE DECISIONS NOW FACING PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SALT II CONSTRAINTS.  
IN AN INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, HE OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF SALT II  
AND WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PERSISTENTLY VIOLATED  
THE INTERIM CONSTRAINTS, PARTICULARLY OVER THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR  
STATION, SSX24 MISSILES AND THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMTRY DATA. THE  
U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED ON MANY OCCASIONS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE.  
THEY HAD TRIED TO DISCUSS KRASNOYARSK RADAR IN THE SPACE DEFENCE  
GROUP AT GENEVA. THEY HAD NOT SIMPLY CRITICISED THE RUSSIANS BUT  
HAD ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RESTORE THE ABM REGIME. THE  
RUSSIANS HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

3. SHULTZ SAID THAT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION  
THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN NOT TO UNDERCUT THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS.  
BUT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOW IN A POSITION WHERE HE WOULD HAVE TO  
DECIDE VERY SHORTLY WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE LAUNCHER NUMBERS WHEN  
THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE STARTED ITS SEA TRIALS. HE IDENTIFIED FIVE  
BROAD OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT:

- (A) STRICT U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE INTERIM SALT II CONSTRAINTS AND  
CONTINUED CRITICISM OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS
- (B) TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET VIOLATIONS CALLED FOR SELECTED  
INCREASES IN THE CONGRESS APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE RELEVANT  
DEFENCE PROGRAMMES:
- (C) TO MAINTAIN THE IDEA OF INTERIM RESTRAINTS BUT TO TAKE  
ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET VIOLATIONS IN ORDER TO  
PRESERVE THE U.S. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. AT THE PRESENT  
STAGE THIS DID NOT INVOLVE PUTTING MIDGETMAN INTO  
OPERATION, BUT IF THE RUSSIANS PRODUCED AND DEPLOYED THE SSX24,  
THE U.S. COULD TAKE COUNTER-ACTION. THE MORE LIKELY OPTION  
WOULD BE ONE OF SEVERAL INVOLVING TAKING OUT A POSEIDON  
SUBMARINE AND PUTTING IT IN DRY DOCK. THE RANGE OF CHOICES  
WOULD INVOLVE TAKING OUT THE MISSILES AND POSSIBLY THE REACTOR  
IN WAYS WHICH WOULD TAKE IT OUT OF SERVICE FOR PERIODS OF FROM  
ONE WEEK TO TWO YEARS. OR THE SUBMARINE COULD BE SCRAPPED.

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/ (D)

- (D) DENOUNCING THE SALT II TREATY AS FATALLY FLAWED BUT CONTINUING THE REST OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
- (E) ABANDONING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND TAKING ONLY RESTRAINT MEASURES WHEN THIS WAS OPERATIONALLY APPROPRIATE.

4. SHULTZ WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON, OPTION (A) WAS A NON-STARTER. OPTION (B) MIGHT HAVE SOME APPEAL. OPTION (D) AND (E) WOULD MEAN ABANDONING THE ARMS CONTROL REGIME WHICH HE, AND MANY OTHERS, WOULD FEEL WAS A GREAT MISTAKE. ONE OF THE VARIANTS OF OPTION (C) MIGHT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF ATTRACTION.

5. IN RESPONSE, GENSCHER SAID THAT HIS REACTION MUST BE TO ARGUE FOR RESPECTING EXISTING TREATIES. EVEN IN THE FACE OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS, THE SUBSTANCE AND PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATIES SHOULD NOT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION. HE WAS THEREFORE PLEASED THAT THE LAST TWO OPTIONS DID NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH SHULTZ. THEY WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLIANCE. BEYOND THAT, HE COULD NOT COMMENT OFF THE CUFF ON PARTICULAR CHOICES.

6. DUMAS SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS CAUGHT BETWEEN A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONS. THE TREATY HAD BEEN OBSERVED BUT WAS NOT RATIFIED. IT WAS APPARENTLY BEING VIOLATED BY THE OTHER SIDE. SINCE HE HAD BEEN ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS, HIS ADVICE WAS THAT FOR OVERRIDING POLITICAL REASONS THE TREATY SHOULD BE RESPECTED, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT RATIFIED. HE THOUGHT IT INEVITABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO PROLONG THE TREATY. IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE THAT THE BEST TACTIC FOR THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE RAPIDLY TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT WOULD PROLONG THE TREATY. BUT, DUMAS SAID CAREFULLY, THIS WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SINCE WE LIVED IN AN OPEN SOCIETY, WE WERE BOUND TO HANDLE THESE THINGS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THE RUSSIANS COULD CYNICALLY VIOLATE THE TREATY WHILE PROCLAIMING ADHERENCE. AT THE VERY HEART OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY WAS THE BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD RESPECT TREATIES. WE DID NOT CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT WHETHER THE TREATY WAS RATIFIED OR NOT. WE ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD BE DAMAGED BY ANY DECISION WHICH APPEARED TO UNRAVEL EXISTING ARRANGMENTS.

8. HENCE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RIGHT TO REJECT THE LAST TWO OPTIONS FROM THE ALLIANCE STANDPOINT ADHERENCE TO THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE THE RIGHT POLICY. AT THE VERY LEAST THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION OUGHT TO AIM TO END UP AS CLOSE TO OPTION (A) AS POSSIBLE. PRESENTATION OF ANY DECISION WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. IF THE U.S. PROCLAIMED THAT IT WAS VIOLATING THE SALT II CONSTRAINTS, THIS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

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9. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD SUMMED UP THE BEST DECISION AS MAINTAINING RESPECT FOR THE REGIME, LAYING UP THE SUBMARINE BUT NOT SCRAPPING IT. THIS WOULD STILL, HE WARNED, NOT BE IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BEGIN FOCUSING ON THIS QUESTION ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY THIS WEEK AND WOULD TAKE A DECISION ON SUNDAY. SHULTZ WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM THIS EVENING RECORDING THE REACTIONS OF THE THREE MINISTERS. HE WOULD INTRODUCE A SIMILAR, BUT MUCH MORE GENERALISED, DISCUSSION AT THE NAC SESSION TOMORROW AND WOULD REPORT THE REACTION OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

10. I SUGGEST YOU CONSULT DAVID GOODALL OR ROBERT ALSTON ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM. IT SHOULD CERTAINLY GO TO NO 10.

BYATT

LIMITED

HEAD/DEFENCE D  
HEAD/ACDD  
HEAD/NAD  
HEAD/SOVIET D  
PS  
PS/MR LUCE  
MR GOODALL  
MR DEREK THOMAS

COPIES TO:

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY

[My own  
White House  
source  
claims  
that this  
has already  
been  
decided]