

GRS 2000A  
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FROM UKDEL NATO 191630Z JUN 85  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 19 JUNE  
AND TO MODUK (FOR DACU), WASHINGTON PARIS BONN MOSCOW  
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON  
LUXEMBOURG OSLO MADRID REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA UKDEL STOCKHOLM  
OTTAWA ANKARA ATHENS ROME BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST  
EAST BERLIN PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW

YOUR TELNO 116:  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL - BRIEFING ON US/SOVIET GENEVA TALKS.

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, GLITMAN, AND LEHMAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE SECOND ROUND OF THE US SOVIET TALKS IN GENEVA. THE US HAD CONTINUED TO EXPLORE AND PROBE ON THE BASIS OF POSITIONS SET OUT IN THE FIRST ROUND, STRESSING FLEXIBILITY. THEY HAD SET OUT IN DETAIL THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SDI RESEARCH AND RESPONDED TO SOVIET PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS ABOUT THEIR APPROACH TO SDI IN GENEVA. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD HARDENED, WAS MORE POLEMICAL, AND DELIBERATELY DILATORY. THE MORATORIUM PROPOSALS WERE REPEATED AND THE LINKAGE OF ALL AREAS FIRMLY STRESSED, (GOING BACK ON SOME INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIRST ROUND). THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO HAVE EITHER NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS, OR INSTRUCTIONS TO STALL. KAMPELMAN EXPECTED LITTLE PROGRESS UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP TOOK NEW DECISIONS BUT HE WAS NOT DISCOURAGED. THE RUSSIANS WERE CONFORMING TO THEIR NORMAL NEGOTIATIONS PATTERN. MOVEMENT COULD BE SUDDEN WHEN IT CAME. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION OF A WALKOUT. EMPHASIS ON BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WAS GREATER.

DETAIL

2. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPEARED TO BE SLOWING DOWN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD NOT RESPONDED TO US WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE VARIOUS METHODS OF REACHING AN EQUITABLE VERIFIABLE BALANCE AND HAD STRESSED A FIRM LINKAGE WITH AGREEMENT ON SPACE. THE PREVIOUS SOVIET SUGGESTION OF A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OPENLY REPUDIATED, TO THE EXTENT THAT EVEN US ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET INF POSITION WOULD NOT RESULT IN A TREATY UNLESS AGREEMENTS WERE ALSO REACHED (ON SOVIET TERMS) ON SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS.

3. EMPHASIS ON UK AND FRENCH WEAPONS HAD BECOME A KEY POINT. THE RUSSIANS INDICATED THAT THEY SOUGHT A BALANCE BETWEEN THE SS20 AND ALL UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT FUTURE UK/FRENCH MODERNISATION PLANS WOULD JUSTIFY INCREASE NOT A REDUCTION IN SS20 NUMBERS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A REFERENCE TO MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT.

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4. THE THREE MORATORIA PROPOSALS WERE REPEATED BUT ANY IMPLICIT SANCTIONING OF US DEPLOYMENTS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED. IN THE SOVIET VIEW THESE WERE A CIRCUMVENTION OF SALT III. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE USING ALLIED INTEREST IN INF TO PRODUCE LEVERAGE ON SPACE. THIS WAS A GLOOMY ASSESSMENT, BUT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHIFTED THEIR EMPHASIS DURING THE FIRST ROUND AND MIGHT YET DO SO IN THE SECOND.

5. ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS LEHMAN, DEPUTISING FOR TOWER, SAID THAT THE US HAD USED THEIR BROAD AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE WAYS OF REDUCING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IN CONTRAST SOVIET STATEMENTS HAD BEEN GENERAL AND REPETITIOUS EMPHASISING THAT PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC AREA WAS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON INF. THEY HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET INTO DETAIL UNTIL THEIR SPACE AND INF CONDITIONS WERE MET. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH OF 31 MAY HAD BEEN EMPHASISED, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO TABLE IDEAS FOR REDUCTIONS WITHIN ONE OR TWO MONTHS OF AGREEMENT ON A MORATORIUM. THEY HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE SUGGESTION OF A 25 PER CENT REDUCTION WAS ANOTHER VERSION OF THEIR 1982 OFFER OF A CEILING OF 1,800 SNDV'S.

6. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REASONABLE SOVIET ALTERNATIVES TO THEIR OWN PROPOSALS IN PARTICULAR ON THE TIMING OF REDUCTIONS AND ON TRADE-OFFS. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE, ALTHOUGH SOME INFORMAL INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN TRADE-OFFS. THE US SIDE HAD RAISED IN GENERAL TERMS THE QUESTION OF THE SS25 MISSILE.

7. THERE HAD BEEN 3 MEETINGS OF THE SPACE AND DEFENCE GROUP, WHICH THE US SIDE HAD USED TO SET OUT FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THEIR APPROACH TO A MANAGED TRANSITION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND THE ABM TREATY. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INSISTED YET AGAIN ON A BAN ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS. THE US HAD ALSO ADDRESSED A NUMBER OF SOVIET STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE US'S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SPACE. THEY HAD REMINDED THE SOVIET SIDE OF THEIR REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO JOIN IN A DIALOGUE AND RENEWED THE OFFER OF A TECHNICAL BRIEFING BY ABRAHAMSON (KAMPELMAN WILL GIVE THIS ON LAST TRY SHORTLY). IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT AMERICAN REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SDI, IN RELATION TO CRAXI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, KAMPELMAN OBSERVED THAT GORBACHEV SOMETIMES APPEARED ILL-INFORMED OR MIS-INFORMED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN GENEVA AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS COMPLAINT WHEN CHALLENGED BY CRAXI.)

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8. THE US HAD DEVOTED ONE SESSION TO THE LEGAL BASIS OF THEIR POSITION ON SDW. THEY RECALLED MARSHAL GRECHKO'S STATEMENT OF 1972 THAT THE ABM TREATY DID NOT LIMIT RESEARCH, AND THE SALT II NEGOTIATING RECORD WHICH SHOWED THAT THE BEGINNING OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITY FOR SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS WHICH WERE NOT FIXED AND LAND-BASED, WAS CONSTRUCTION OR TESTING OF FIRST PROTOTYPES. THEY HAD ALSO STRESSED THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO PERMIT ITS ADAPTATION TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CITED EXAMPLES.

9. SUMMING UP KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH HAD BEEN NEGATIVE AND DISAPPOINTING, REPEATING AND REEMPHASISING PREVIOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE POSITIONS. HOWEVER HE WAS NOT DISCOURAGED, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONFORMING TO TYPE AND THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO PROBE AND EXPLORE. HE HOPED TO HAVE MORE TO SAY AT THE END OF THE ROUND.

10. ALL THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE WELCOMED THE BRIEFING AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET TACTICS. HE STRESSED THAT EVEN IF THE ACCOUNT GIVEN WAS DISCOURAGING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN CHANGE ALWAYS EXISTED AND WE MUST BE READY FOR IT. WE MUST NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL ITSELF. THE SOVIET TACTICS SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE INDEED HOPING BY PROPAGANDA AND WEDGE-DRAWING TO SPLIT THE ALLIES: IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT FOR ALLIES TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR US POSITIONS. HE REPEATED HMG'S POSITION ON SD RESEARCH IN STANDARD FORM. HE ASKED IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT (PARA 3 ABOVE) AND HOW THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO JUSTIFY THEIR INCLUSION AND THE EXCLUSION OF EQUIVALENT SOVIET AIRCRAFT.

11. OTHER DETAILED QUESTIONS CONCERNED THE EFFECT OF THE NAC LISBON COMMUNIQUE (THE FRENCH PR INTERVENED TO EMPHASISE THE UNDERLYING SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE DESPITE THE DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION): WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE HAD GIVEN MORE DETAIL ON THEIR INF MORATORIUM: WHETHER THEY HAD REACTED TO US CLAIMS ABOUT SOVIET BMD RESEARCH: WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN THREATS OF A WALK-OUT (AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BY ARBATOV TO THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW): AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES (SS25 AND KRASNOYARSK).

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12. IN RESPONSE KAMPELMAN STRESSED THE IMPRESSION OF TOTAL INFLEXIBILITY GIVEN BY THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS. ANY EFFECT OF THE LISBON COMMUNIQUE WOULD NOT BE FELT THIS EARLY, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGN OF IT. HE WELCOMED THE FRENCH PR'S STATEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR OWN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES IN BMD, BUT THERE HAD BEEN LESS DENIAL. THEY HAD CLAIMED THAT SOVIET RESEARCH WAS QUOTE NOT PURPOSEFUL UNQUOTE. NON-COMPLIANCE HAD BEEN RAISED IN GENERAL TERMS BUT THE DETAIL WAS DEALT WITH IN THE SCC. THERE HAD BEEN NO REFLECTION OF ARBATOV'S VEILED THREAT IN THE TALKS. IN 1983 THERE HAD BEEN SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON AIRCRAFT BUT IN THE FIRST ROUND THIS YEAR THEY HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE BRITISH TORNADO (WHICH HAD EARLIER BEEN DROPPED FROM THE SOVIET COUNT), BUT HAD GIVEN NO DETAIL. IN GENERAL THE SOVIET SIDE HAD USED CONTRADICTIONARY ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO THE CONTEXT: AND IN RELATION TO THIRD PARTY FORCES HAD ARGUED THAT IN ASSESSING THE NATO/WP INF MISSILE BALANCE ONLY BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE NATO SIDE (BY IMPLICATION ARGUING THAT U.S. LRINF WERE STRATEGIC AND ILLEGITIMATE (SEE PARA 4 ABOVE)).

13. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WHILE THE NEGOTIATORS WERE CONSTRAINED BY NEEDS OF CONFIDENTIALITY OTHER REPRESENTATIVES, PARTICULARLY EUROPEAN POLITICIANS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. WHILE THERE WAS GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN THE US POSITION, THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE IN THE FACE OF THE TOTAL SOVIET REFUSAL TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION: IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THE US TO PRODUCE NEW POSITIONS, MERELY IN ORDER TO COUNTER ANY PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF INFLEXIBILITY. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A BRIEFING AT THE END OF THE ROUND, PROBABLY WITH AN EXPERTS SESSION.

14. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY BAG FOR FCO, MOD UK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS.

GRAHAM  
BT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS  
LIMITED

ACDD  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
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MR GOODALL  
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MR WESTON  
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