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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 207

OF 091430Z OCTOBER 1985

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, NEW DELHI, ACCRA, CANBERRA, BRIDGETOWN,
 COLOMBO, DHAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, GEORGETOWN, HARARE,
 KINGSTON, LAGOS, NAIROBI, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
 BONN, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, PORT OF SPAIN, SINGAPORE, LILONGWE,
 LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE

YOUR TELNO 930 : SOUTH AFRICA AND CHOGM

1. I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, SIR L PINDLING, TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR, ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD BE THE BAHAMIAN POSITION FROM THE CHOGM CHAIR RATHER THAN FROM THE BAHAMIAN DELEGATION SEAT THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST. PINDLING SAW ME FOR ALMOST AN HOUR ON 8 OCTOBER. I LEFT WITH HIM A PAPER BASED ON YOUR PARA 8. HE WAS RELAXED AND AFFABLE THROUGHOUT.

2. HE SAID AFTER HEARING ME OUT, THAT WHILE OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WERE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT BRITAIN DID NOT WANT (THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS), IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WE DID WANT. HE THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE, AND AS CHAIRMAN WOULD TRY TO FIND THE COMMON DENOMINATOR. IN RESPONSE TO MY HAVING TOLD HIM THAT MY APPROACH WAS ONE THAT WE WERE MAKING IN OTHER COMMONWEALTH CAPITALS, TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF BRITAIN'S POSITION BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, HE SAID HE WAS SURE ALL OUR AFRICAN POSTS WOULD REPORT THAT THE ARGUMENTS I HAD ADVANCED AGAINST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE REJECTED BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT HIS OWN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES SHOWED THAT THOSE WHO BY OUR ARGUMENTS HAD MOST TO LOSE, EG BOTSWANA, WERE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS. HE NAMED A STRING OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES, PLUS HINDIA AND SRI LANKA AS EXAMPLES OF OTHERS, WHO TOOK THIS VIEW. BUT, HE SAID, FROM HIS SOUNDINGS, INCLUDING AT THE COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING IN MALE FROM WHICH HE HAD JUST RETURNED, HE BELIEVED THAT FEW OF THOSE COUNTRIES BELIEVED IN PUSHING BRITAIN TO THE WALL ON THIS ISSUE.

3. HE SAID HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PERSUADE BRITAIN TO TAKE QUOTE ONE OR TWO MORE LITTLE STEPS UNQUOTE. TALK OF A TOTAL ECONOMIC BAN WAS ONLY POLITICAL RHETORIC, BUT BRITAIN OUGHT TO SHOW SOME EVIDENCE OF A WILLINGNESS TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT. HE SAID SOME ECONOMIC SANCTION OUGHT TO BE APPLIED, IF ONLY TO MAKE SOUTH AFRICA SEE THAT THEY WERE NOT TOTALLY IMMUNE TO THIS KIND OF ACTION AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIENDS SHOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO HELP HER SAVE HER FROM HERSELF BY SUCH INDICATORS.

4. I QUOTED THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEASURES AS EXISTING EXAMPLES OF MANIFESTATIONS OF OUR GOOD FAITH, AND WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THESE, GAVE HIM A LIST. AFTER EXAMINING THE

HE SAID THEY DID NOT MEAN MUCH EG ON ARMS SALES BANS HE SAID SOUTH AFRICA GOT ITS ARMS WITHOUT TROUBLE FROM ISRAEL, AND ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION SAID ISRAEL, AND INDIRECTLY THE US THROUGH ISRAEL, HAD HELPED SOUTH AFRICA IN THAT FIELD.

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5. SIR L PINDLING SAID HE WILL WANT TO GET THE CONFERENCE OFF THE HARD ISSUE OF SANCTIONS, BUT HOPES BRITAIN WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER SOMETHING OTHER THAN EXPRESSIONS OF CONDEMNATION OF APARTHEID ETC. FOR EXAMPLE SOME POSITIVE NEW MOVE OVER NAMIBIA AND ESPECIALLY TO GET SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT THE UN POSITION ON NAMIBIA, OR GREATER ASSISTANCE TO BOTSWANA, SWAZILAND OR LESOTHO, EITHER ECONOMIC, OR MORE PARTICULARLY, PROTECTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, COULD MEAN A LOT TO THE AFRICAN STATES, AND MIGHT HAVE ALMOST AS MUCH PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AS SANCTIONS. HE SAID THE RAIDS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES INTO THE TERRITORY OF OTHERS WERE THEMSELVES EXPRESSIONS OF APARTHEID. HE HIMSELF STRONGLY FELT THAT BRITAIN COULD NOT JUST SAY NO TO EVERYTHING PROPOSED BY OTHERS, BUT SHOULD COME UP WITH ALTERNATIVES ALONG THESE LINES. HE FOR HIS PART SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO AL

L HE COULD TO TAKE THE DISCUSSION OFF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS SUCH, BUT WAS SURE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO LOOK FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE POSITIVE MEASURES FROM BRITAIN.

6. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OR SECRETARY OF STATE AT AN EARLY STAGE, AND HAD HAD IT IN MIND TO SEEK SUCH A MEETING ON 16 OCTOBER BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OPENED. HE POINTED OUT THE SHORTAGE OF TIME THEN. HE SAID HIS BEST SLOT WAS 10.30 OR 11.00 AM THAT MORNING, WHICH HAD THE ADVANTAGE THAT HE COULD ALTER HIS OPENING REMARKS FOR THAT AFTERNOON IF NECESSARY UP TO THAT TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS. HE SAID HE PROPOSED TO SPEAK FOR ABOUT THREE MINUTES ON SOUTH AFRICA IN AN OPENING SPEECH OF ABOUT TWELVE MINUTES.

7. FINALLY HE SAID HE HOPED BRITAIN WOULD NOT APPEAR TOO INFLEXIBLE OR PROVOCATIVE ON THIS ISSUE. HE RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NEVER OUR AIM, BUT HE HAD SOUGHT TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE FIRMNESS OF OUR VIEWS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT TOO IN HIS PREPARATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS.

HEAP

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