

GRS 650

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NASSAU (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S AND SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTIES)

TELNO 004

OF 221345Z OCTOBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO (PERSONAL FOR DAUNT), MODUK (PERSONAL FOR HOWE, DACU)

INFO ROUTINE BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

MY TELNO 2914: MBFR

SUMMARY

1. MACFARLANE BELIEVES THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL AGREE TO THE UK/FRG PROPOSAL. A CASE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER RAISING THE MATTER BRIEFLY WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 23 OCTOBER?

DETAIL

2. MACFARLANE TOLD MALLABY ON 22 OCTOBER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO DECIDE QUOTE IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO UNQUOTE HOW TO REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON MBFR. MACFARLANE THOUGHT THAT HIS DECISION WOULD BE ONE WHICH WOULD PLEASE THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN 'MOVED' BY HER MESSAGE. THERE HAD BEEN GREAT RESISTANCE TO THE UK/FRG PROPOSAL (FROM THE PENTAGON) BECAUSE SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE REDUCTIONS AREA MIGHT GO NO FURTHER THAN THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS, WHEREAS US TROOPS WOULD CROSS THE ATLANTIC: THERE HAD ALSO BEEN CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OF BREAKING WITH NATO'S PREVIOUS INSISTENCE ON AN AGREED DATA BASE. HOWEVER, THE NEW UK VERIFICATION IDEAS COMMANDED CONSIDERABLE RESPECT, AND THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THAT THE UK/FRG PROPOSAL, IF IMPLEMENTED, MIGHT PROVIDE A MEANS OF UNCOVERING THE DATA WHICH NATO HAD SOUGHT FOR 12 YEARS. IF (AS MACFARLANE CLEARLY ASSUMED) THE PRESIDENT WERE TO DECIDE TO AGREE TO GO DOWN THE ROAD CHARTED BY THE UK AND FRG,



HE WOULD WISH TO INSIST THAT THE ALLIANCE STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE THAT DATA EXCHANGE WOULD REMAIN ESSENTIAL FOR ANY COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, OR INDEED THE CONTINUATION OF A LIMITED AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE CURRENT PROPOSAL.

3. MALLABY POINTED TO THE ADVANTAGES FOR THE PRESIDENT IN HAVING A WESTERN MEMBER PROPOSAL TABLED BEFORE THE 12 NOVEMBER MEETING. MACFARLANE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE RIGHT: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAS A CANNY SENSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCING NEW IDEAS ON OUR SIDE UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

4. THIS CONFIRMS THAT, FOLLOWING SHULTZ'S DECISION TO BACK OUR PROPOSAL, AND THE GENERALLY FAVOURABLE NSC DISCUSSION ON 18 OCTOBER, THE TIDE IS STILL FLOWING OUR WAY. BUT IT ALSO CONFIRMS THAT THE TIMING OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, AND HENCE OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA, IS STILL UNCLEAR: AND WE KNOW THAT PENTAGON ATTEMPTS AT FOOT-DRAGGING CONTINUE. IN OUR VIEW, THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE ADVANTAGE IN THE PRIME MINISTER BRIEFLY MAKING TO THE PRESIDENT, IN THE BILATERAL MEETING ON 23 OCTOBER, THE LINK WITH THE SUMMIT.

5. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UK/FRG PROPOSAL. RATHER THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT SIMPLY SAY:

(A) THAT SHE HOPES THAT HER MESSAGE PROVED USEFUL SEMI-COLON AND

(B) IF HE AGREES TO OUR IDEAS, SHE WOULD SEE CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVANTAGE FOR HIM IN HAVING THEM TABLED IN VIENNA BEFORE 19 NOVEMBER, SO THAT THEY CAN BE REFERRED TO PUBLICLY THEN. IT WOULD BE GOOD TO PUT THE RUSSIANS ON THE DEFENSIVE.

WRIGHT

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